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PREFACE 
This report reviews the effectiveness of seed aid in Kenya, with emphasis on the prooess and products of aid 
delivered during tñe Long Rains 1997 (February to June). While focusing 00 a single seasoo just after a 
drougbt, it draws on a history of almost 10 years ofrepeated seed aid. with yet another intervention being 
organízed as this report is being written. From an 'intemal' organizational perspective. the report explores how 
the seed aid was managed at tñe cornmunity level and then puts this in the view of an 'externa)' perspective 
that examines the effects of seed aid interventions on the longer-term sustainability ofKenyan farming 
systems. One of the unique features of this report is its inc)usion of a strong component of smallholder 
fanners' own assessments and retlections on the effectiveness of the seed-aid intervention. 
A worksbop on seed-system analysís was also funded under this grant--drawing from the Kenya findings but 
also on a range of seed interventions in Eas! and Central Africa (Sornalia. Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda) and select 
sites beyond (e.g .• Honduras and the 'Mitch'-related emergency assistance). This workshop, helil June 21-24, 
2000, in Kampala. Ugsnda, sougbt lo accomplish the following: 
l. Exchange and synthesize 'better practices' among seed-system interventions in East and Central Africa; 
2. Developlrefine conceptual tools formare ¡nformed design of seed-system interventions. 
The proceedings of the U ganda workshop are published as "Targeted seed aid and seed-system 
interventions -strengthening srnall-farmer seed systems in East and Central Aftica". 
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Executive Summary 
l. Context 
1. This report reviews tbe effectiveness of seed aid in Kenya, witb emphasis on tbe process and products 
of aid delivered during tbe Long Rains 1997 (February to June j, While focusing on a single season just 
afier a drought, it draws on a history of almost 10 years of repeated seed aid, with yet another 
interventíon being organized as this report is being written. One ofthe unique features ofthis report is 
its inclusion of a strong component of smallholder farmers' own assessments and reflections on Ibe 
effectíveness oflbe seed-aid intervention. 
2. Seed aid, as distinct from food aid, is a relatively new phenomenon in the Horn of Africa (dating within 
the last decade) and both seed aid and seed-system support have yet lo be seen as something 
fundamentally different from food aid and food-assistanee support. 
Seed aid is differen!!Tom food aid ín a! leas! three key aspects: 
Seed is no! intrinsically useful. It has (o be adapted to the immediate biophysical environment, 
and adapted 10 farmers' potential management levels. It also has a built-in, ofien narrow, time 
límit for usefulness. 
- Seed interventions aft'ect the heart of a farmer's agricultura! systcm-such as farmers' 
prograrnming (ofland, labor, intercropping patterns )--and lie il into a routine that assumes a 
certain stabilíty. Further, allbough seed is often given under Ihe rubric of short-terrn 
interventíon (the 'Seed and Tools' paradigm), ils effects on the agricultura! system can be !ong-
tenn. 
- Seed is costlier than food for all key actors (farmers, implementers, donors). 
3. In Kenya, seed aid has been delívered on a fairly large scale~about every olher season sinee 1992~ 
and across a large number of dístricts. The focus has becn heavily on maize over the years and 
Ibroughout Ihe regions. 
4. The case study draws from research al four siles where seed aid distribution has taken place 
(Machakos, Baringo, Makueni, Embu/Mbeere). These siles were chosen so as lo compare and contras! 
aid delivery by a variety of organizations, both government and nongovernmenl (NGOs), with slight1y 
differen! approaches 10 seed-system support in similar agroecological contexls. 
The study examines both the internal process and efl'ecls of seed aid delivered during lhe Long Rains 
1997 (February to June), along with the external process and effects: 
- Internal process and effects rcfers to issues such as the appropriateness ofthe crops and 
varieties distributed and the targcli llg of seed-aid recipients. 
- External process and effects examines how the seed-aid inlervention affccted filrmers' broader 
agricultural management strategies and whether the seed helped farmers get back on their feet 
and establish a sustainable means of aceessing desired seeds. 
n. The internal process and effects of seed 
1. Most farmers interviewed receíved seed aid in 1997 (77.8%) wilh the sites managed bylbe Government 
ofKenya (GOK) generally givingmaize and beans (plus vegetable seeds in Baringo), and the NGO-
managed sites distributing sorne maize and beans plus a range ofmore drought-tolerant crops (eowpea, 
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sorghum, millet, pígeon pea). One site also prograrnmed in a component offarmer capacity building (in 
improved seed production). 
2. Farmers generally assessed the crops and varieties given as appropriate. The more drought-101erant 
crops wcre also deemed 'acceptable'-as long as mail.e was one oflhe elements in the aid package. 
Furthermore, farmers commented on the high quality oflhe seed; most ofthe funners sampled did not 
routinely use certífied seed or maize hybrids (except in Baringo). Theyrecognized the 'luxury valuc' of 
hybrids, but not necessarily just for direet sowing. Farmcrs can exchange the packaged maize for 
urgentlyneeded items (for example, food staples such as salt, sugar, and oH). Seed aid in this sense 
achieves a 'currency' function. Thus, the 'products' delivered received high ratings. 
3. Farmers expressed strong disconlent with al! three 'process' variables--that is, Ihe tíming (generally 
late), targeling (not transparent), and quantilies ofseed received (too little). The less rigorous targeting 
was directly related lo lesser quantities received per farmer. Overall, the process variables were raled 
higher at a single site where a prior assistance/development program had been eslablished. 
4. Eaeh ofthe four siles had speeific built-in biases in targeting, with thepossible exception ofa 
govemment-managed site (Machakos) where there was a blanket dístribution for all appearing at public 
meetings. Apparent biases inc1uded those who organized into work groups (Makueni), Catholics 
(EmbulMbeere), and those with access lo irrigated plots (Baringo). There was sorne evidence that 
poorerpopulations were a180 specifically reached in the EmbulMbeere sample. 
5. Lack oftargeting transparency i8 creating social fríctions. Farmers cited 27 differenl (sometimes 
conflicting) eriteria used to selee! recipients. At GOK-managed sites, all expect seed as part of a 'public 
good' and 'tbeir right.' The fuzzines8 in targeting al80 refleets an ambiguity in the goals set for the seed-
aid distribution (see poin! II. 7, below). 
6, While vouchers were not given, exploration oftbeirpotential acceptability showed farmers very divided 
as 10 theirusefulness and acceptability. Much depends on (a) the availability ofloeal crops/varieties, 
even ifpurchasing power is guaranteed, and (b) the will power of farmers to use the cashlvoucher 
solely for seed stocks. 
Different kinds of farmers seem lo prefer different options, based lo a certaín extent on wealth. The 
very poorest prefer seed aid because oftbeir fear of diverting money and because the maize hybrid is 
beyond theír normal reach, Richer farmers--a good number ofwhom receíved seed aid--··generally feel 
equally disposed lo the two options because hybrids are what tbey normalJy use and they have little 
trouble reaching the seed stocks. The issue of distance to market cross-cuts wealth categories, as does 
a concern Iha! 'quality' seed (local quality seed as wel! as certified) just isn't available in local markets. 
In areas where aid organizations are experimenling with non-maize options, farmers sometimes prefer 
the seed aid jusI because tbe crops or varieties tbey desire (green grams, cowpeas, millets) may no! be 
easí1yaccessed otherwise. 
7. Most fundamentalIy, the inlernal analysis sbowed thatthe goals of giving seed aid were not very 
transparent in the foureases analyzed. Based on an analysis ofpraetice, there were al leasl four 
different goals: 
-- 10 fiU a lemporary seed gap--for Ihe farma lo have somelhing lo planl 
- 10 encourage self-help, or for farmers 10 aehieve a self-sustaining seed-produetion slrategy 
lO give a gifi lo a poli/ieal conslituency-'-political combined with farming goals 
lo slimulate 'progressive' modern farming praetiees. 
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None ofthese goals is inherently negative, although the first two probably more closely parallel goals 
aspired lo in emergency stress situations. However, the multitude oí goal s, and accompanying 
approaches, create confusion ahout what the seed is for and create false expectations as well as 
unnecessary dependencíes. 
8. Even the small number of cases suggests Ihat seed aíd (procuremenl and delívery) ís more effectíve 
when decentralized: 
TIle choice of crops and varielies can be more local and tailored to the environment. 
Targeting on a smaller seal e is more accurale 
A range oC approachcs is possible, rather than standardized ones. In sorne cases, seed alone may 
be needed; in others, skíll building may prove crucial, and in slill others, novel approaches in 
erops and crop management may be vitaL 
1Il. Externallogic of seed aid: Has it served to strengthen farmers' seed and agricultural systems? 
L Since 1992, on average, eaeh farming family has received seed aíd twíce, with a hígh of 10 times. Thus, 
most farmers, irrespective oí wealth, have received seed aid more than once in the last decade. Those in 
the 'church sample' (EmbulMbeere), who correlated more with poorer segments, received seed aid 
once in about every two seasons. Farmer comments suggest that many have come to expect 
'ernergency' aid on a continued basis. 
2. Seed aid of maize, whích was the ¡ion's share of aid given, provided 14% ofthe total rnaíze sown in the 
Long Rains 1997, while for beans, aíd seed represented 11 % ofthe total sown. TIle situation for 
sorghum and cowpea was slight1y different because aid agencies mos! often gave these crops expressly 
lo diversip¡ farmers' crop profiJes in more drought-prone arcas. Aid seed for these minoríty crops 
accounted for 33% and 27% oflhe total seed SOV.'Il for sorghum and cowpea, respectively. Thus, 
during the emergencyperiod, furmers accessed the majority oftheir seed for all fouT crops analyzed 
(maize, beans, sorghum, and cowpeas) by themselves. Across crops, a large portion of seed was 
sourced from local markets (not stockísts), even in ecologically stressed arcas. 
3. The research assessed the portion offarmers relying on seed aid for 100% oftheir seed sown during 
(he Long Rains 1997. Overall figures varied from 14% to 66% of [armers al each site. However, a 
closeranalysis, bycrop, shows thal onlysix farmers (cut ofl71 total across sites) relied 100% on 
seed aid for their key crops--that ís, those crops in whích they themselves normally invested. For most 
farmers, seed aid supplíed their full seed stocks for a single crop only ífthe crop were relatively new or 
oflower priority (as in the case of cowpea, sorghmn, pigeon pea, or millet), or in the case oí income-
generating vegetables such as onion, kale, and tornato. 
4. Across sites, farmera primarily assessed thoir top two príority crops as maize and beans, with some of 
the more drought-tolerant crops cíted in thi .. , nlace al unirrigated sites and the íncome-generating 
vegetables ciled where the supplyofwalerwas more reJiable. TIle matchíng offarmers' priorities with 
what !hey received as aid showed that, overwhelmingly, farmers received al leas! one oflhe crops they 
consider 'most' importan!. 
5. Farmers can 'normally' use sorne seven pOlentiai channels for accessing seed . Formaize, nearly a1l 
farmers regularly use home-saved maíze seed as their maín source and, a180, regularly use the local 
market 10 10p off supplies. Use ofstockist seed, that is, use oíimproved varieties and certífied seed, is 
key only in the Baringo sample, although between one-quarter and a third of farmers in Machakos and 
EmbulMbeere claim lo use ít 'occasionally.' Certified seed and hybrids are rarely used in Makueni. TIlis 
overwhelming dependence on local maize seed perseveres in a context oC very vigorous and prolonged 
government efforts to promole hybrid and certified material. 
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6. For beans, across sites, farmers use home-saved stocks as their central source for seed. However, local 
markets appear as an equally used souree. Given that bean seed can easily be selected out from the 
prevíous harvest (Le., as it í5 self-pollinated), it is surprising how many farmen get bean seed off-mrm 
every season or every other season (about 30% across the siles), with high amounts being acquired in 
this way (70% plus ofstocks). Thus, most furrners get more than halftheir bean seed off-farm on a 
regular basis. 
7. For both maize and beans, the Kenyan data run counter to what is ofien taken as a truism when 
describíng farmer seed systems: that ís, that about 80% ofthe seed used by 'normal farmers' comes 
from their own stocks and !hat acccssing off-farm seed sources is 'abnormal.' The Kenyan material 
shows that small fanners routinely rely on local markets for a significant portion oftheir seed. 
8. Fanners overwhelmingly expressed dissatísfaction with their maize-procurement strategy, with the 
notable exception ofBaringo where the 'progressive' sample accesses seed from stockists. The large 
majority can't afford certified seed (and find the prices exorbitant) and complain about the local market: 
the right varieties are no! available, the seed is poor qualíty, merchant~ cheat on quantity, and the 
distances are too great.Thís widespread dissa!isfaction seems relativeJy serious for a crop Ihat tbnns 
¡he core oftheir agriculture. 
9. For bean-seed acquisitíon, fanner sentiment is al so strong and c\ear across sites. The largo majority find 
themselves heavily tied to the local market-spending money but not sure ofthe quality they are 
receiving. Because beans are self-pollinated, fanners generally regard bean seed as somelhing they 
shouldn't have to buy, using the money instead for school, medicine, and [ood. Overall, what does the 
'average' farmer want in tenns ofbean seed? Self-sufficiency. She wants to save seed money, lo save 
transport getting seed, and she wants the seed on time--all implying that home-saved seed is lhe way to 
go. 
10. Have seed trends improved for maize and beans over the las! decade? Apparently not-jusl the 
opposite. Prices have gane up, exchange networks have become weaker, and deteriorating soil fertility 
and fragmentabon have meant smaller harvesls. The few positive developments--some new varieties, 
the emergence ofseed aid, the packaging ofvarieties in srnaller packet~o little to counteract very 
strong negative forees. 
11. There i8 no concrete evidence that seed aid, per se, is strengthening farmer systems. Those who have 
received it once are nol necessarily less likely to receive il again, and the amounts given were not 
significant in the contexl of funners' overall seed-procurement strategies. Further, the main crop 
given--hybrid maize--does not ensure lbat farmers can become less dependen! on outside sources: it 
only performs in better conditions and has a built-in deterioration mctor. Considering!hat il only treats a 
symptom, and perhaps no! in the mas! effective way, seed aid (Seed-and-Tools), as currently delivered, 
seems to be a rather costly inlervention. 
IV, Characterlzing seed system constraints and opportunities: The Kenya case 
1. The external analysis ofthe farmers' seed situation in Kenya raises a number offundamental questions 
about the type ofproblem seed aid ls and was supposed to alleviate. Seed-and-Tools programs-thal 
is, the delivering of quantitíes of seed and basic lools on a one-offbasis (the kind ofintervention being 
practiced in Kenya}-are designed lo help furrners out ofa temporary, and well-defined, acule 
situation. Seed and lools are given in a context where a series of assumptions are made, whether they 
are consciously articulated or no!: 
tha! farming systems bave suffered an acule jolt and farmers have losl vital seed 
tha! given a discrele injection of seed-a boost-furmers will have the means to plant the seed 
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given: Iha! labor and inputs are adequate to plan! and harvest, and that tbe situation is sufficiently 
secure 
tbat tbe seed given, once, will help furmers re-establish an independent means ofproducíng and 
accessing their 0\\'11 seed. 
2. The external perspective on seed aid has documented the general vulnerability offarmers' seed systems 
and overall agricultural systerns. For some Kenyan farmers, the last decade has been one in which they 
have suffered droughts on a repeated basia. Between distinct, severe dry periods, their fanning systems 
have operated well, However, witb sharp drops in rainfall, like tbat in 1991-92 and in 1996, they have 
required help from tbe outside 10 gel back to where tbey were, These furmers have been experiencing 
repeated acure stress. 
3, For many Kenyan fanners within tbe sample, the seed stresses they describe are neither acute nor 
repeatedly acute. Theyare there on acontinua1 basis, Small plots (and harvests), unreliable rainfall, lack 
of adapted varieties, poorly adapted crops (like maize in many areas), distant markets, scarcity of cash 
to purchase seed-·all oftbese things hinderthe fanners' ability 10 produce andlor access sufficient 
quantities ofseed each season, While seed-and-tools treat theirproblems as acule; indeed, their stress 
situatíon is a chronic one, 
4, A framework is started within this report for examining aCUle. repeated acule. and chronic stresses, 
cross-cutting these seed-system disastertypes with root causes: agroecological and politicalleconomic, 
as well as seed-system issues tbemselves, In plotting material relating to seed-system functioning from 
tbe Kenyan case, economic and polítical constraints leap forward as a major fanner-articulaled 
constraint. Further, the analysis shows tbat focusing on seed and variety issues,per se, Is not effective 
for dealing with the real bottlenecks in many seed-system situations. 
5. Tho issue of'right seedlcrop' is examined in the context of emergency versus nonemergency sítuations, 
At a mínimum, crops/varietíes for emergency interventions need to be 
adapted to filnners' biophysical environment 
adapted lo farmers' preferences 
adapted to farmers' management conditions 
promoting risk aversion. 
'Right variety/crop' is also examined on the basis of acute, repeated acute, and chronic seed-system 
stresses. 
6, Hybrid maize proves to be a poor choíce in the context of acute, repeated acute, and chroníc stress 
situations, Most filnners do not roulínely access hybrid maize seed from the stockist and therefore 
probably do not have the management expertise wilh which lo nurture the 'aíd' varieties, Moreover, 
most maíze hybrids have not traditionally ¡. 'n designed for suboptimal environments and the built-in 
genetic deterioratíon ofhybrids doesn't necessarilypromote self-relíance for those fanners who cannol 
afford 10 renew their stocks annually. Simply, the overriding bias on hybrids-·across years and 
regions--makes ¡he situation something 'Jfan extreme or classic case ofignoring a basic emergency 
principIe of promoting risk aversíon. 
7, A range of seed-system support interventions in East Afríca-which go beyond seed-and-tools-is 
reviewed, These interventions have various goals, such as delivering more locally adapted varietíes, 
ensuring tba! even tbe poorest farmers can gel new materials, improving the quality of fanners' seed, 
and even helping farmers earo money from seed-production operations. They iIlustrale Ihat a body of 
work is emerging to help address some ofthe more chronic constraints lo seed-system heallh. 
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8. A paramount challenge 10 strengtheningtbe systems bywhich fanners access seed rests in a more 
refíned diagnosis ofwhere tbe constraints and opportonities He. Analysis of seed systems-farmer, 
formal, and !hose !hat aim to integrate!he two-is a relatively new field. Prior to a decade ago, 
developmentwork focused almost exclusively on supporting!he institutionalízed, formal seed sector. In 
Afiica, seed-system experts estimate lbat such institutional channels may supply farmera with, al most, 
5% oftheir seed, tbe obvious exception being maíze in areas where hybrids are widelyused. 
9. The report ends by sketching the full components of a seed system and tbeir interlinkingrelationships. 
Continuing to deliver seed-and-lools may be analogous to putting a band-aid en a gushíng wound. Only 
a more-targeted diagnosis can lay!he foundations for more-targeted interventions-interventíons that 
have longer lasting positive impacts. 
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Section 1 
lNTRODUCTION ANO OVERVIEW 
Report goals 
This report has modest, yet focused, goals" It aims to examine the effectiveness of a single season of 
emergency seed aid, delivered in Kenya during the 1997 'umg Rains' (from February to June). It examines 
the internal process and effects ofthe seed-aid intervention as it unfolded in fOUT different regions, through 
the Govemment ofKenya (GOK) and through two nongovemmental implementers. Intemal process and 
effects refers to such issues as the appropriateness ofthe crops and varieties distributed and the targeting 
of seed-aid recipients. Equally, this study considers the external process and effects of seed aid and 
examines how the seed-aid intervention did (or did not) help farmers overcome what looked like an acute 
stress situation (that is, a reduced hervest due to marked drought). An examination ofthe external process 
and effects loob atthe effectiveness ofthe aid in the context ofthe farmers' broader agricultural 
management strategies and asks whetherthe seed helped farmers get back on their feet and re-establish a 
sustainable mode ofaccessing desired seeds (see Annex 1 forterms ofreference for the study). Much of 
these analyses come from a previously unheard viewpoint: the perspective ofthe end-user-male and 
female smallholder furmers" 
This report also has a second main goal. Using the Kenya case study as a grounded base, it aims to 
stimulate the development of conceptual models, management guides, and practical tools fur sharpening 
external interventions in the area of seed-system support" The term seed system refers to the range of 
components that make a seed system sustainable. This includes all phases !Tom seed and variety testing, to 
multiplication, to different channels of distribution and storage. Each phase embraces technical and social 
organizational fOI1IlS---4Jperating al levels from the household upwards. Finally, we incJude in !he notion of 
seed system, a11 systerns lhat filrmers may use-Iocal, formal, and any intermediary/intertwined forms. (The 
lasl section ofthe report discusses in sorne depth Ihe concept and practice of seed systems.) 
Seed, !he physical input planted into a field (which has genetic, physiological, analytical, and sanitary 
qualities), is only one critical elemen! to sustaining a seed system--and not always the crucial one lo 
support in times of a social or ecological disaster. Reaching this second goal, development ofrefined and 
practical lools and guides, requires longer time horizons tbat go beyond the fmalization ofthis report. A 
first significant step has been completed in the convening of a workshop from June 21-24, 2000, in 
Kampala, Uganda, entitled "Targeted seed aid and seed system interventions: Strengthening small filrmer 
seed systems in East and Central Africa." This workshop drew together a group of seed-system and 
disaster-management specialists to forward our understandíng of(a) how 10 characterize the components 
of seed systems, (b) how to dístinguish among differenl kinds of seed-systern stresses (with accompanying 
indicators), and (c) how lO start to link a more accurate diagnosis oC seed-syslem stress with a more 
targeted method of outside intervention support. (Annexes 5 and 6 contain the seminarprogram and list of 
participants, respectively.) Case studies were drawn predominantly !Tom East and Central Africa (Uganda, 
Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, Democratic Republic ofthe Congo, and Ethiopia), but lessons were also drawn 
from key; more far-flung sites, such as Honduras (the HurricaneMitch inlerventions). 
The Kenya Seed Aid report and the complementaryworkshop (funded also under grant #LAG-41 I 1-00-
3042-00) both aim lo encourage thinking beyond what have become somewhat simplistic orseed-and-tools 
interventions. 
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Tbeproblem 
Every country in the Horn of Africa has experienced drought, civil disturbance, or both within the last 10 
years, with many regions having experienced stress on a near continuous basis (for exarnple, fue 
Democratic Republic ofthe Congo, Burundi, and northern Rwanda). A pessimist might say that 
instability-rather than its opposite--is becoming ¡he norm for East and Central Africa. One ofthe results 
ofthe prolonged turmoil is that repeated 'emergency interventions' are taking the place ofneeded longer-
term research-and-development (R&D) programs. 
Along with disasters, either natural or man-made, have come increasing infusions ofboth food and seed 
aid. For instance, as this report ís beíng written, the Government ofKenya has called for US$ 100 million in 
food aid and US$ I million in seed aid for a single season, and the United Nations has jusI appealed for 
US$ 377.7 million for emergency assistance in Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Kenya combined, 
including US$ 8.9 million for seed~ and other agricultural needs (Dehai-news 2000). 
Seed aid, as distinct from food aid, is a relatively new phenornenon in the Horn of Africa. A recent 
comprehensive review of seed-aid prograrns (ODI 1996), which interviewed nongovemmental organizatíons 
(NGOs), nationa! agricultura! research systems (NARS), government ernergency branches, and international 
agencies, found Ihat seed aid--or specifical1y, seed-and-tools, whích represents the dominant form of seed 
aid-is a concept ofthe last 10 years.2 Reviews of relief and rehabilitation journals (e.g., Dísasters), 
operational manuals, and a range of personal comrnunications from field practitioners) also show ¡hat the 
seed-aid paradigm has deveJoped squarely on ¡he tracks of food-aid procedures. Seed and seed-system 
support has yet lo be secn as somethíng fundamentally dífferent from food aid and food-assístance 
support. 
Repeated drought in Kenya over the last ) O years has resulted in repeated, near continuous distributíons of 
seed aid. Since 1993, when a governmenl body, the Emergency Drought Recovery Programrne (EDRP), 
was first formed to deal wíth the effects of droughl in arid and semi-arid areas, yearly seed-aid distributions 
have taken place across a broad range ofKenyan ecologies. Government structures havo also responded to 
the (pereeíved) increasíng frequency of drought by starting to construct preparedness units, such as 
district-level drought-emergencyplans and district disaster-relief cornmittees. 
Drought is nol a new phenomenon in Kenya. One specialist describes 18 significan! droughts in the century 
between 1883 and 1984-übout one every five-and-a-halfyears (Downing el aL 1989), Most evidently, 
droughl is related lo fluctuatíons in weather patterns and, hence, local water availability. However, equally 
important is thal this 'lack' has to be linked to specific spatial and temporal parameters associaled with the 
resource base that communities access. For example, whetherthe amount ofland farmers have access to-
and from which they can get a harvest-has remained constant (Sandford 1979). J Landholdings ín Kenya 
havo decreased overthe last 20 years, perhaps by as much as 15% for smallholder farmcrs (author's 
estimate). Drought or its acute effects rnay he hecoming more common largely because farming systems, 
and particularly poorer farm holdings, are increasingly less resílíent (with less land, fewer crops, and less, 
little, or no surplus to slore). 
The history and importance of seed aid in Kenya 
The decade of Ihe 19905 
Seed aid has heen distributed by the Governmenl ofKenya on a relatively large scale since 1992. In raet, 
there has been a distribution nearly every season since then. While there may have been ísolated seed-aid 
efforts by NGOs in single regions or siles before 1992, Ministry of Agriculture records (complemented by 
íntematíonal organization and NGO oral histories), sugge5t the concept and practíce of seed aid in Kenya 
dates back only eight years or, al most, 16 seasons. 
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During Ibis consultancy, it did not prove possible lo trace Ihe exact amounts ofaid or crop/varíety pro files 
delivered duríng the differenl governmental seed-aid interventions. While official records c1early publisbed 
tbe amounts requested, delineated byprovince and by crop, managers attest that funds received were 
routinely below those requested and that the crops/varieties requested were often not tbose in stock al the 
Kenya Seed Company (KSC), which is Ihe near total supplier of government-coordinated seed aid. (One 
reason forthis bias may be Ihat the KSC offers the GOK seed against credit.) Thus, while official dístricl 
and MOA requests included seed aid in the form of sorghum, cowpeas, or beans. it was overwhelmingly 
hybrids and vegetable seeds (onions, kale. tomatoes)--that is, more commercial crops-that have been 
received on a dependable basis from KSC during the last eight years of emergency assistance. 
Govemment seed distribution, Long Rains 1997 
For the period under íntensive review, Long Rains ¡ 997. Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) records document 
the amounts delivered on a nationwide basis (table 1). 
Records from the Office ofthe President (OP) further give some ínleresting insights into the ímportance of 
government seed-aíd seed in relation to the total seed planted in a given dístrict. Among the eight districts 
(out of 46) which filed final seed-distribution reports in 1997, the ("ange in importance ofseed aid was 
impressive, witb government maize-seed 3id accounting for an area rangíng from srnall (6%) to large (54%) 
(table 2). These kinds ofstatistics, however imperfect or incomplete, are important for assessingjust how 
vital outside aid was (or was not) in tbe various regions. 
A similar table (table 3) has been constructed for data reported to the Office oflhe Presiden! on other 
crops, notably vegetables and rice. The number of cases is too small to draw firm insights, but it looks as if 
govemment aid has been a vehícle for promoting vegetable gardening during emergencies. 
Table 1: Seed dlstributed as ald by the GOK, Long Ralos 1997 
I I 
t'KU V l<"ILt. MAIZE i ONIONS TOMA TOES I KALE 
(Tonnes) (kg) i (kg) (kg) 
Eastem 631.0 762 530 233 
I 
RiftValley 539.5 563 405 218 
¡ Nyanza 174.0 80 50 48 
I I 
¡Central 266.0 50 27.5 38 
i Coast 88.0 - -
-I 
,1 North Eastem 26.0 - -
-
Westem 34.0 
i 18 I 15 17 
Total 1758.5 1473 1027.5 
I 
554 
Source: Mmistry of Agriculture. Seed distribution sheets provided by Food Crops Research Department 
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Table 2- The re1ative Importance of maIze seed ald against total areas planted, 1997 . 
1: DISTRlCT "'.rea planted wiili govenunent % oi total district area rnaize 
maize..seed aid planted from seed aid 
! 
1 Tana 319.0 ¡ 36.5 
Koibatek 3,200.0 31.3 
MWingi 1,441.2 9.3 
WestPokot 2,976.0 12.4 
; 
Kwale 799.0 I 53.8 
Kajiado 1,648.0 i 6.4 
I Keiyo 2,880.0 I 15.2 
! Busía I 960.0 9.3 F-
1I Total 
I 14,223.2 13.3% (average) 
Source: Office ofthe President.: tally ofraw data sheets, by District, entitled : "Final Seed Distribution 
Report (n.d .•• forLongRains 1997) 
Table 3: The relative importante 01 vegetable seed aid agalnst total areas planted, 1991 
! 
1 
1
I 
'1 
, 
DISTRlCT Area p!anted wiili government o/~ oftota! district area Vegetablesl 
vegetable-seed aid planted ftom seed aid , 
1 
¡ Koíbatek 260.0 
1 
100.0 
f.--- ; 
i Kajiado 274.3 
i 
24.4 
¡ Keiyo 420.0 
1 
46.7 
i Busia 
• 
93.0 
I 
35.6 
ITana 176.0 25.6 
Source: Office ofthe Presiden!.: tallyofraw data sheets, by District, entitled: "Final Seed Distribution 
Report (n.d .. - for Long Rains 1997) 
In brief, seed aid has been delivered on a fairly large seale about every other season, and aeross a large 
number of distriets. The focus has been heavily on maize across regions and years. 
Seed !lid versus food aid 
¡ 
.: 
1
I 
I 
1: 
In introducing and exploring the meme of seed aid, it is important to highlight how distinct it i8 ftom food 
aid. The qualities mat distinguish seed are different ftom ones Iha! identifY food: seed occupies a central 
role in thefarming (notjust digestíve) system, and seed aid in general i8 probably eostlier for all actors than 
is comparable food aid. These points are elaborated below and each should dramatically affect how such 
aid i8 operationalized. 
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Seed as djstjnct (rom food 
Seed in itselfis not intrinsically useful. To provide benefits lo the fanner, il has to be adapted lo the 
immediate biophysical environment and adapted to farmers' potential management levels, which include no! 
just laborbulaccess lo potentiallycritical inputs (manure, fertilizer, etc.). Seedalso has a built-in, often 
narrow, time limit for usefulness: if nol planted in jusI the right seasonal intervals, it may not germinate, or 
mature, or survive a drought. 
Seed is also nol a producI whose value may be irnrnedialelyvisible. While analytical purity and sanitary 
quality can be sometirnes visually assessed, genetic and physiological trailS often become apparenl only 
after the seed is planted and first emerges (ODlI996). Therefore, the procurer has lO have unusual 
expertise-in both the characteristics ofthe variety/seed and the specific contexts in which it might be 
sown. 
Seed interventions take place at the heart of a farming system 
Seed interventions affect the heart ofa farrner's agricultural syslem. They affeet a farrner's prograrnrning (of 
land, labor, intercropping pattems) and they tie her to a routine that assumes a certain stabílity-that what is 
sown can be harvested, five months or even up to one year later. 
Although seed is ofien gíven underthe rubric ofshort-terrn intervention (the 'seed-and-tools' paradigm), its 
effeclS on the agricultural syslem can be significantly long-termo Under a positive scenario, furmer-
appreciated varieties may be sown season after season (at least ror the self-pollinated crops; hybrids have 
built-in self-destruction). Under a negative scenario, poor seed can spread disease ror a season or twO. 
More drarnatically, seed aid gíven again and again can alterthe profile offurrning syslems and even render 
them less stable. The widespread distribution ofmaize in the southern regíons of Arnca has certainly been 
blarned for this latter effect (van Osterhout 1996). 
Seed is more expensive than food for all actors 
Logically, it would seem lhat seed aid is more expensive for all actors involved (although follow-up 
ca1culations stiJl need to bemade).' 
Far the donar, a good-quality variety or seed is more expensive per unil than whal one would buy for 
grain. The process of delívery is also costlier if one aims lo both target the 'seed-short' populatíons and 
couple the croplvariety with a compatible agroecological envíronment. Simplyput, more 'niches' (and 
hence, the delivery of more 'niche products') need lo be considered Iban is necessary with a blanket food 
distribution, or even a targeted one. The window of deliverytime is also more narrow (discounting food-aid 
situations where populations are in critical disttess). 
"or thefarmer. seed aid is certainlynot a 'no-strings' gift. It uses up the furmer's land and labor al critical 
moments. Planting seed and tending the growth/harvest periods has several kinds of opportunity coslS. 
Seed aid may substitute for other cropslvarieties that Ihe farmer could also have sown. And seed-related 
activities take searce time away ftom activities that are not seed-related. 
FinalIy, seed aid is especially expensive when it has to be repeated. One ofthe key rationales for giving 
seed aid versus just food is Ihat it can help farmers get back on their feet to produce their own food in the 
not-so-near future. 
It ís clear that the rendering ofusable seed aid is a formidable task. Also given the huge amounts spent on 
seed aid, it is odd tbat relatívely few in-depth analyses exist for guiding such operations. The how-to guides 
known by the author are all very recent-and variable in their coverage ofthemes and quality (ODl1996; 
11 
Johnson 1998). Seed-and-tools sections,per se, do exist in a number oflargermanuals (USAID (BHR/ 
OFDAlPMPP), 1997; Coneem, n.d.), yet, in their símplícity, perhaps theyrisk being more 
counterproductive than helpful. 
Two fundamental tenets on seed aid shape Ihis reporto First, the purpose of seed aid should aim lo jump-
start farming communities back into a self-help mode. As elaoorated by ODI (1996): 
The rationale for seed provision during and after emergencies is that it can re-establísh a 'self-help' 
mode within cornmunities affected by emergencies. Once familíes have basic seed and basic tools, 
they can start the process ofproducing their own food andJor making money from selling crops. 
Second, whíle secd aid is often given under Ihe rubric of'emergency' support, by its nature, the giving of 
seedhas to be pul within a developmental andJor recovery context. Something planted today, during an 
emergency, may bear fluit five to nine months later in a changed eontext. If re-sown, seed can have 
socioeconomic, production, and bio-environmental effects for several years onwards. 
Rationale for case study oC secd aid in Kenya 
Seed aid, as truly distinct from jaad aid, is a relatively new type of intervention, and there have been few 
evaluations ofi!. Thís Kenya case aims to explore some ofthe strengths-and constraints-imposed by 
seed aid, as welI as to feflect on the paradigm of seeds-and-tools itself. In ¡he immediate context, tbis type 
of analysis aims to make the process and product of seed aid more effective, especialIy fOf the 
beneficiary-the smallholder farmer. However, the longer-term goal of such an analysis is to reduce tbe 
need for emergency seed assistance, through defining strategies Ihat both (a) strengthen secd systems 
tbemselves and (b) build a capacity for a more locally based seed response. 
Report layout 
The next section presenta the general methods used in the study. Section 3 then analyzes the intemal 
process and effects of seed aid in 1997. Section 4 provides the external complement, looking al the longer 
terrn of'external process and effects' ofseed aid. Based on such insights, section 5 offers insights into 
characterizing different types of seed-system stress and ways oflinking more targeted action to stress. 
The four site cases are discussed and contrasted so as to Icam from their differing strengths and 
challenges. No direct comparisons orjudgments should be made, as the implementers' contexts for giving 
seed aid varied greatly, for example, in terms of scale, funds available, and flexibilíty to act at al! phases. 
The aim ofthis overall study is to construct a set of scenarios for better practice. 
Summary: Key Points 
l. Seed aid, as distinct from food aid, is a relatively new phenomenon in the Hom of Africa (wíthin the last 
10 years). Seed aid and seed-system support has yet to be seen as something fundamentally different 
from food aid and food-assistance support. 
2. Seed aid is different from food aid in at least three key aspects: 
-- Secd is not íntrinsically useful. It has to be adapted to the irnmediate biopbysical environment, as 
well as to farmers' potential management levels. It also has a built-ín, ofien narrow, time limít for 
usefulness: ifnot planted in just the right seasonal intervals, it maynot germínate, mature, or 
survive stress periods. 
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- Seed interventions affect the heart of a fanner's agricultural system. They affect the farmer's 
programming (ofland, labor, lntercropplng pattems) and they tie her lnto a routine that assumes a 
certain stability. Further, although seed ls often given as a short-term intervention (the seed-and-
tools paradigm), lts effects on the agricultural system can be very long-termo 
- Seed ls costlier than food for all key actors (farmers, implementers, donors). 
3. In Kenya, seed aid has been delivered on a fairly targe scale-since 1992, about every other season and 
aeross a large number of districts. The foeus has been heavily on maize across regions and throughout 
theyears. 
4. The ease study examines the intemal process and effects of seed aid delivered during the Long Raíns 
1997 (February to lune), along with the external process and effects: 
- Internal process and effects refers to such issues as the appropriateness ofthe crops and varieties 
dístributed and the targeting of seed-aíd recipients. 
- External process and effects examines how the seed-aíd íntervention affected farmers' broader 
agricultural-management strategies and whether the seed helped farmers gel back on their feet and 
establish a sustainable means of accessing desired seeds. 
5. Much ofthese analyses draw from the perspeclive of end-users: male and female smallholder farmers. 
6. Two fundamental tenels of seed aid are proposed: 
The purpose of seed aid is to jump-start farmjng communities back jnto a self-help mode. 
Seed aíd has lo be put within a developmental andlor recovery context. Seed sown can have 
socioeconomíc, production, and bio-environmental effects for severa! years onwards. 
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Section 2 
METHODOLOGY 
Sources and overview 
This report draws information and lnsights from varied sources. Substantial written documentation was 
provided by al! direct collaborators: the (}Qvemment ofKenya, Ministry of Agriculture, Office oflhe 
President, Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI), Catholic ReliefServices (CRS), the Diocese of 
Embu Parish, and GerrnanAgro-Action (GAA). This information encompassed in-house logístical notes 
and correspondences, operational reports, and select intemal program evaluations spanning the emergency 
program cycle (from first stages ofproblem identification through to post-intervention assessments). Direct 
interviews were held among seed-aid managers and planners at various levels of operation (key personnel 
ofthe Office ofthe President and Ministry of Agriculture, NGO managers and individuals who designed 
specific emergency and development fieldactivities, church leaders, and developmentlrelieffield stafi) (see 
Annex II for a list of persons contacted). Extensive interviews were also conducted with end-users, 
beneficiaries, or local decision-makers. Sorne 171 furmerinterviews were conducted in the four main sites 
ofMachakos, Makueni, EmbulMbeere, and Baringo, with a pre-test phase taking place at a fifth site 
(Thika). 
Choice of sites 
Four siles were chosen for carrying out intensíve farmer interviews (Annex III lists specific locales). These 
sites were selected to provide a basis for discussing and contrasting aid delivery by a variety of 
organizations with slightly different seed-system support approaches in similar agroecological contexts. 
The choice of siles was alBO heavily dependent on institutional interest in collaooration. Only ir 
implementers were open 10 an intensive evaluation oftheir activitie&-an exchange ofinsights-were sites 
considered. Thís study was partially designed to stimulate self-reflection. 
Table 4 sketches the key parameters ofthe sites-·~all in areas where there had becn some seed-aid 
distribution. These tend to be smallholder arcas with lower, sporadic ralnfall. In Baringo and Machakos, the 
ímplementers were Ministry of Agriculture district staff. In MbeerelEmbu, Ihe Diocese distributed the seed 
aid, with financial and sorne technical support from an NGO, Catholic ReliefServices.ln Makueni, German 
Agro-Action, another NGO, was the key implementer. GAA had ínitiated an exlensive program in 
strengthening the seed system prior to drought, starting in 1995. Their aim was to rnaintain nutritíonal 
standard s partly by diversifying crops and improving methods oflocal seed production. This prior 
development activity proved 10 be critical in Iheir making better-targeted and -ínformed interventions during 
emergencyperiods. 
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Table 4: Field sites chosen for study of seed aid given long rains 1997 
4.1. Government-implemented seed-aid si/es 
1: MACHAKOS 
; Implementer: MOA 
Semi-Arid 
UM4 'Suntlower-Maíze Zane' 
700-800 mm annual rainfulI 
I gaveseed 
4.2 NGO-implemented seed-aid sites 
MAKUENI 
Implementer : NGO 
Gennan Agro-Action 
"---------~" .. .._~~ .. _~~ .. 
Semi-Arid 
LM5 'Millel-Livestock Zone' 
600-800 mm annual rainfall 
drought cornmon 
gave seed plus: 
organized fanners in groups j 
,1 
skill building in seed production 
: BARINGO 
Implementer: MOA 
Semi-Arid 
LM5 'Livestock-MilIet Zone' 
650-950 mm annual rainfall 
Focused on fanners with access to irrigated plots 
Jgave seed 
EMBUIMBEERE 
Implementer: Church and NGO 
Embu Parish with support from Catholic Relief 
Services 
Semi-Arid (with variation ftommedium lo lower 
potential) 
LM4ILM3 'Marginal-eotton Zone' 
780-900 rum annual rainfull 
: gaveseed 
! 
I 
Note: LM signifies land rnanagement category (Ministry of Agriculture). 
Specific metbods used 
l. Fieldwork process among farmers 
Direct interviews with farmcrs were carried out in July 1998. University and professional enumerators were 
first trained in a two-day workshop along with a t" .¡-day pre-test. In Machakos, Makueni, and Baringo, 
sampling ofthose lo be interviewed was done randomly, within general zones where seed aid was recorded 
to have been distributed in 1997. In the olhertwo areas (EmbulMbeere and Thika), the intennediary 
organizations provided detailed lists of farmers who had supposedly received seed for the 1997 Long Rain 
season. 
Interviews were always conducted in Ihe locallanguage (which ofien was not Swahili) and lasted about one 
haur each. Both male and fernale farmers were inlerviewed, with bolh men and womell on the interview 
team. The 1997 Long Rain was choscn as a season for specific study becausc the last aid package was 
given al Ihal point in time and it was close enough lo remember in sorne detail. While (he sarnpleof 171 
farmers rnay be loo smal! lo extrapolate for national or even regional statistical analysis, the sarnple was 
unusually large [ortbe intensive inlerview format adopted. Certainly in terms offarmer insighls, Ihis analysis 
is the most complete one on the process and effects of seed aid in Kenya to date. 
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2. Consu1tation with wider body ofseed-aid practitioners 
In pre-fieldwork visits in both February 1998 and June 1998, a wide range of aid organizations, disaster-
reHef specialists and agricultural managers were consulted (see annex 3). Individuals were given ample 
opportunity to comment on the tcrms ofreference, tbe project design, and the initial findings. This was 
done both through private cornmunicatÍon (rendezvous, email) as well as in organized public meetings (see 
poin! 4 below). 
3. Review ofliterature 
Most oftbe more-infonned publications on seed aid and seed-system relief(in both the officia! and gray 
!iterature) are products oftbe last five years. We used tbe term informed to refer 10 reportsldocuments tba! 
recognize tbe cQmplexity of small-fanner seed systems. They recognize tba! fanners may relyprincipally on 
their own seed systems (sometimes called farmer, local, or infonnal seed systems) or drawprincipally from 
fonnal seed systems (depending on the crop}-or a combinatíon ofthe two. Infonned seed-system 
perspectives al so recognize the dynamic between social aspects of seed systems (e.g., is your neighbor 
going lo lend you the seed or not?) and its technical dimension (varietal choice, aspocts of seed quality, 
etc.). Sorne ofthe Iiterature reviewed is directlycited in tbis reporto A more extensive bibliography will 
appear in the compendium workshop proceedings on "Targeted seed aid and seed-system interventions: 
Strengthening small-farmer seed systems in East and Central A frica." 
4. Public meetings during stages of design and resultsanalysis 
A public pre-study preparalory and familiarizatíon meeting was held in Naírobi al the Kenya Agricultural 
Research Institute (KARI) on March 13, 1998. Similarly, a public pre-closure was held at the same institute 
onJune 26, 2000, to discuss results and interpretations among collaborators-before finalization ofthis 
reporto These public consultations very much affected the design ofthe initial program as we1J as the 
interpretation of results. Meetings were attended by a range of organizations: for example, representatives 
from USAID, The World Bank, The Rockefeller Foundation, the Office ofthe President, scientists from 
international agricultural research centers (CIAT and ICRISAT), scientists from KARI, and personnel from 
NGOs (CRS, GAA, and World Vísion). 
S. Workshop interchange among 'experts' and direct repart users 
Finally, a workshop, held in Kampala in June 2000, served as a sounding board foc presenting tbe 
preliminary results oftbis Kenya seed stody. As tbeworkshop brought together seed-aid and disaster-relief 
specialists working in East and Centra! African regions, the seminar served to contextualize tbe Kenyan 
cases amidst a wider range of similar rehef actions in such countries as Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Uganda, 
and the Democratic Republic oftbe Congo. 
Surnrnary: Keypoints 
l. Intensive analysis was done at four sites where seed-aid distribution took place in 1997 (Machakos, 
Baringo, Makueni, EmbulMbeere). The sites were chosen to provide a basís for discussing and 
contrasting aid delivery by a variety of organizations (govemmenl and NGO) with slightly different 
approaches to seed-system support in similar agroecological contexts. 
2. The metbods encompassed extensive field interviews (171), a literature review, broad consultation with 
seed-aid practitioners, two publíc meetings, and a targeted workshop bringing toge(her seed-system 
analysts and disaster-management specialists. 
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Section 3 
THE INTERNAL LOGIC OF SEED AID: 
LONG RAlNS 1997 
Oftbe 171 households interviewed, 133 (77 .8%) received seed at tbe fOUT sites (including tbe test site). 
This section draws on botb groups--lhe receivers and non-receivers of seed-when surnmarizing 
qualitative insights and reflects on the internal process and effects ofthe seed-aid distribution. This 'internar 
type of analysis is sometimes programmed in a follow-up action by governments (see, for example, Anon. 
1997) orimplementing NGOs (e.g., CRSlKenya-DRI 1997). Taking place shortly after implementation 
(eitber during tbe planting season or just after harvest), this 'internal evaluation' explores questions of crop 
and variety choice, logistical procedures (timing and metbods of distribution), adequacy of amounts given, 
and beneficiarytargeting. This internal evaluation of a seed-aid intervention may be used 10 help sharpen tbe 
process ofgiving seed aid in future deliveryperiods, Once tbe decision has been made to embark upon a 
seed-and-1ools programo 
Products of seed aid: Farmers' perspective 
Croo and variet;y choice 
Table 5 shows tbe crop profile of seed aid given in 1997 at each oftbe four sites. At tbe government-
managed seed-distribution sites, Machakos and Baringo, fanners generally were provided maize and sorne 
beans, as has been tbe trend since tbe beginning of seed-aid distribution in 1992 (see GOKlMOA seed-aid 
liSIS). In addition, aid recipients ín Baringo, most ofwhom had access to írrigated plots, received a range of 
vegetable seeds. These latter crops are key for income generation by supplying more greens to urban 
markets. 
Maize and beans also were given at the NGO-managed distribution sites, EmbulMbeere and Makueni, 
tbough 10 a significantly smaller proportíon offanners. As al! four sites are semi-arid and prone 10 tbe 
effects of drought, tbe NGOs, botb GAA and CRS, have been workíng to diversity tbe crop profile of 
fanners in their rones of action. Witbin tbe scope of seed-aid distribution, both promoted more droughl-
tolerant crops, such as cowpea, millet, green gram, and pigeon pea. While all tbe crops given as aid in these 
latter siles are known lo fanners, few listed them as among theirpriority crops (see section 5). The diet of 
Kenyans, even in these drought-prone areas, is very much rooted in maize and beans, however vulnerable 
tbeir actual production may be. 
From the fanners' perspective, the crops given as seed aid (table 6), as well as the varieties (table 7), were 
appropriate. lt proved unnecessary 10 disaggregate these data by site, given the high coincídence among 
responses. Interviews showed that fanners, fundamentally, expect maize and beans for seed aid, altbough in 
sorne oftbe drier areas, additions such as sorghum and cowpea are acceptable as long as maize seed is one 
ofthe elements in tbe aid package. (Most fanners were given two different crops as seed aid during tbe 
same season.) 
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Table 5: Aid croP$ recelved by farmen: Long Rains 1997 (pereent oC Carmen at eaeh slte 
receiving glven seed-aid crop) 
CROP Makueni Embw'Mbeere ¡ Machakos Baringo 
(N=30) (N=33) (N=35) (N=28) : 
i Maize 40.0 63.6 82.9 75.0 I 
: 
1 
: Beans 16.7 18.2 65.7 7.1 
:! 
Sorghum 33.3 54.5 17.1 
. 
Millel 23.3 : 12.1 
: Cowpea 
I 53.3 33.3 5.7 : 
I Pigeonpea ! 
I 
6.7 ¡ 
Greengram 
i 
6.7 
! 
¡ Onions i I 14.3 : ¡ 
i KalelCabbage I ! 7.1 
I . 
I 
: 
: Tomatoes 
i 
10.7 
, 
I Other veg~tables J ! I 10.7 
.. J 1: (cornmercial) . I ¡ 
Table 6: Farmers' assessment ofthe crops distributed during tbe emergency situation, Long Rains 
1997, in response to the question, "Were tbey the appropriate crops?" 
'[---- -----
I 
¡ 
¡eROP No. offarmers receivingthis VES 
! 
NO No Opinionl 
j type of crop aid (%) (%) Don'tKnow 
: 
Maize 91 97 
! 
2 1 
. 
43 I 
95 I 2 2 Beans 
Sorghum 34 : 97 3 . 
I 
I 
I 
LOwpea 29 97 3 I - i[ , 
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Table 7: Farmen' assessment of the varieties dlstributed during the emergency situation, Long 
Ralns 1997, In response to the question, "Were tbey tbe correct variety oftbe given 
crop?" 
CROP& Number offanners YES NO No Opinionl 
VARIETY commenting on variety % % Don'tKnow% 
Maize 91 96 3 1 
Beans 43 86 2 12 
Sorghum 34 94 6 -
Cowpea 29 93 7 -
However, tbe satisfaction oftbe majority does not mean that al! fanners were content wilh the aid package. 
Se!ected comments signa! areas of concem. Several farmers !Tom tbe Embu/Mbeere sample mentioned 
how risk:ytbe maize hybrids may be in more marginal zones (numbers in parentheses indicate tbe number oC 
tbe farmer interview): "When we are given reliefand there is a decline in rainfall tbat season, we don't get a 
harvest" [No. 32]. "The seed-relief aid during the emergency period has been good-but only ifthe rains 
are tbere" [No. 23]. "The maize varieties from seed reliefand from the stockist are less adapted to the 
environment than ourJocal varíety" [No. 20]. 
Furtber, in Machakos, the possible inappropriateness ofthe aid, in relation to smallholders' means of 
production was highlighted: "Seed relief should be complemented witb fertilizers so tbat tbe seed given as 
aid isn't wasted by some poor farmers who can't afford fertilizers to gel a good yield" [No. 55]. 
Finally, even sorne oftbe positive cornment~ relating to farmers' satisfaction with what tbey received 
question whetber tbis seed aid was serving tbe goals traditionally expected in emergency situations. The 
followíng exarnples of comments raise basie concerns about what seed aid achieved (nurnbers in brackets 
indicate the number oftbe farmer interview). 
From Makueni sample: 
"It is a way ofbringing new varíeties of early-maturing crops to me and my neighbors." [No. 129] 
From Baringo sample: 
Seed aid introduces farmers to new crops and newvarieties. [Nos. 107,156, 157, 165] 
"Because of seed aid, 1 now know about onion farming." [No. 172] 
"Seed aid is how can 1 get maize seed from my farm without going lO a stockist every season." [No. 155] 
"Because of seed aíd, rny fanning has been improved: 1 have learned how to plant properly, how many 
seeds per hole, time ofplanting." [No. 112] 
"As an incentive [to getseed aid] you have to proveyourworth in terms offarmingmethods utilized." [No. 
159] 
From Embu samp/e (showing seed aid is equated with receiving something new or 'progressive'): 
"Seed aid should be accompanied by technical advice on spacing, fertilizer, and otherpractíces. There are 
instructions on tbe package, but they are in English." [No. 1] 
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From Ihese comments, we see that seed aid has saved farmen¡ money for certified seed, introduced new 
varieties, introduced new crops, and introduced/slimulated progressive farming practices. AH ofthese may 
or maynot be important-but are nol necessarily related lo alleviating acute stress. 
Oua]itv of seed received 
Across sites, both the quality and germination properties ofthe seed given were deemed remarkable (table 
8). Simply pul, mos! farmers have nol used certified seed--or only when given il free. In the case ofmaize, 
the seed aid, which consisted primarily ofhybrids (the 500 series and 600 series) and tbe composite variety 
Katumani, was al80 highly valued because most farmen¡ (except in Ihe Baringo sample) did nol routinely 
SQw hybrids (see section 4 on routine procurement sourees for further discussion). 
Unlike many seed-aid sítuations, farmen¡ in tbis Kenyan sample recognized 'tbe value' ofthe seed 
commodilies delivered, but nol necessary jusI for direct sowing. Fanners repeatedly mentioned how easy it 
is to exchange tbe two-kilo package of maize for an ilem Ihat mighl be more urgent1y needed (for example, 
slaples such as salt, sugar, and oil). Seed aid in Ihis sense is achicving a 'currency function' beyond its 
more írnmediate sowing (and hence production) value. 
Table 8: Farmen' assessments of the quaUty of tbe seed received* 
IFEATURE Makuení EmbulMbeere Machakos Baringo 
(N=30) (N=33) (N=35) (N=28) 
Seed Quality vs normal seed Better = 72% Same= 25% 
Germinatíon vs nonnal seed BetteF 70% Same= 27% 
* Given their similarity, responses were combined across all four siles 
Percentage oC seed aid sown 
How did these fanners' subjective assessments ofthe appropriateness of seed compare witb their actual 
practices? At least according to farmers' testimony, tbe great majority ofthe aid seed was sown-across 
crops and across locations (table 9). For instance, 85% offanners sowed all (100%) ofthe maize seed 
Ihey receíved as aid, while 72% ofthose receiving cowpea sowed all (100%) ofthis erop given as aid. The 
relatively lower proportion of sorghum and cowpea sown reflects fanners' secondary preference forthis 
erop, although by absolute standards, the percentages sown indicate positive interes!. Reading the table, 
83% ofthose who received sorgbum seed sowed at least half ofthat aid given. 
Table 9: Percent of seed aid received that was actually sown by farmen (by crop) 
1 Percent level of seed sown 100 I 99-75 I 74-50 49-25 24-1 O , 
• Maize (N=91) 85 4 5 1 1 3 
Beans (N=43) 88 - - 2 S 5 
1 
• Sorghum (N=34) 56 6 : 21 6 6 6 
, lN=L~) 72 13 4 7 - 6 
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Proeess oC seed ald: Farmers' perspective 
Theprocess ofseed-aid delivery during the 1997 Long Rains proved more problematic for farmers ror 
several reasons: the timing of delivery, fanners' perceptions ofhow beneficiary-targeting took place, and 
their valuation ofthe actual arnQunts received. 
Timjng of deliv!lJy 
While seed arriving late is a common complaint across seed-aid interventions, in Kenya in 1997 il appears 
thal Ihe process was given an unusually late start due lo the delay in announcing an official emergency-the 
end ofJanuary 1997 (CRS-KenyalDRI 1997). Funds forseed purchase and transport canno! be raised until 
an official emergency is declarro. Only GAA in MaIrueni, which had a prior seed-assistance program on 
site, was able to deliver most oftheir aid punctual1y (table 10). 
Table 10: Farmers' assessments oC timing oC seed-aid delivery, Long Rains 1997 (pereent oC 
responses) 
I Site N lnAdvance OnTime Somewhat Late Too Late 
jMakueoi 30 27 30 3 -
MheerelEmbu ¡ 33 12 36 i 24 27 
, 
Machakos I 35 3 II 51 34 
I 
&ringo 28 32 36 
, 
18 14 I i 
Targeting 
The official rules (theory) oftargetingproved very differen! from 'hetter practice' in the Kenyan situation-
and caused some discontent. Here, we review both the theory (what is written officially) and how targeting 
actually unfolded. For seed aid, targeting challenges are basically twofold: (a) to identify those who actually 
need seed aid and (b) to ensure they have the means lo use it (thal is, the land and labor necessary for 
sowing, and suffieient stabilíty lo guaranlee thal seeds planted are harvested). More fundamentally, 
however, policymakers have 10 decide whal the seed aid is for-tbat is, what goals il wanls lo achieve-
and this mus! be done prior lo choosing lechniques oftargeling. This is unclear in both the official rules 
and subsequenl practice, as is seen below. Targeting aid lo sustain the chronically seed-poor is different 
from helping Ihose temporarily in seed stress, and it is differen! from using sero aid lo introduce new 
varieties and to further catalyze the efforts ofmore progressive farmers, 
1. Targeting seed aíd: The view of the dispenser 
Bolh governrnent and church officials are well aware of sorne ofthe seed-targeting chalIenges and 
problems. There are official guidelines·-and then there exists actual practice, Le., what theypredict will 
oceur. 
Guidelines 
The official guidelines elaborale eritería for recipients of seed aid, The list below is taken frorn both 
government and church documents. 
21 
Govemment documents: 
MOA: Those in need of seed and who cannot purchase seed themselves 
MOA: Land should be ready to cultivate and ready forplanting 
MOA: Beneficiary should (if possible) have purchased enough rertilizer 
MOA: Beneficiary should plant seed strictly according te the recornmendations ofthe area 
agricultura! assistant 
MOA: To ensure that the maximum numberofpeople benefit, each farm familywiU get only 
one type of seed 
MOA: [allotment according lo farm size J e.g., a maxímum of one 10 kglbag per person 
[household]. If farm síze !ess Ihan 1 acre, then the amounl should depend on farm 
size cultivated, Le., 5 kg per 1/2 acre cultivaled 
MOA: Targeted according to the region's potential and farming acreage 
Church documents CDiocese ofEmbu): The poorest-those in need of seed aid are considered the same 
population as those in need of food aid: 
those who have not received reliefthrough govemment or any otherrelief organization 
those who canno! obtain seed through other means 
those who have prepared a minimum of 1 acre ofland 
those who have prepared land but have no seed 
With the Church, there is usually a two-tier process of selection. The seed-needy are identified within what 
is already considered a vulnerable agroecological zone. However, ít is nol clear whelher Ihe seed-needy 
within higher-potentiallless-vulnerable zones are also targeted with seed aid. 
2. Seed-aid targeting methods used in Kenyafor reachíng beneflciaríes ({rom interviews) 
The written guidelines listed aboye contras! with what actually unfolds. Several government oflicíals were 
particularly frank about the challenges of actual targeting. They want both clearer mandates and more 
'rough and ready' tools to seleet recípíents. 
Reflectlons of field-Ievel government omcials on actual practlce 
l. In theory, 'needy lists' are drawn up through local eommittees: Social Dimensions Development (SDD) 
Committees, Drought Disaster Preparedness Committees, Local Development Committees-and 
sometimes by the Chief. 
In practice: 
• It is hard to exclude anyone. Usuallya baraza (local meeting) is caBed and those who want seed 
present themselves. Frequently, pre-packaged seed (in 2-kg and 5-kg packages) needs lO be 
opened lo accommodate increased demando One oflicer commented, "Not unusually, a very 
needy person may get but a cupful of seed. Sometimes it is so líttle, they say, '1 don't even want 
that.'" Farmers themselves also help lo corrupl the process away from ¡ls original goals, saying, 
"Everything free from the government should be forus all." 
• Local committees may be highly política! in choice ofbeneficiaries. Many non-needy are included 
as seed aid comes increasinglyunder the rubric of a 'govemment gift.' AIso, elected oflicia!s 
have a vested interest in ensuring that theír own constituencies are well-served-whether they are 
in need of seed or nol. 
• The social pressures are such that those who receive may be obliged to redistribute to those who 
do nol. Government oflicers insightfully remarked that the poor could be disadvantaged in the 
long ron ifthey did not share with others. They are invo!ved in social networks ofhelp. So, ifthey 
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don't share seed, neighbors won't help them with other activities, such as labor exchanges: "You 
get free seed and don't share with me-don't come to me for other help." 
2. In theory, there ís an analysis of need and beneficlaries tbrough identification onocal zones where there 
are production shortfalls. Percentage shortfalls are estimated (e.g., from 5 Tlha to I T/ha), vulnerable 
zones are identitled, and then a percentage ofthe 'needy' is suggested (e.g., "20% ofthe population in 
this zone probably cannol huy seed on their own"). 
Inpmctice: 
• The buís for estimating the percent of seed needed withm a zone is not clear. Seed needs are 
calculated on the basis ofvague acreage estimates of crops in the given zone during normal times. 
For example, the seed needs are extrapolated bymultiplyíng recommended sowing rates by 
estimated total area, then divided by a seemingly arbitrary percentage of'seed-needy,' i.c., to 
cover 20% ofthe acreage ofcrop x in zone y, then 20"10 ofthe acreage ís assumed to equate with 
20% ofpopulation. 
• Officials also franklyadmitted they rarely have the resources to travel across their zones to see the 
full variability in harvest perfurrnance. 
• In brief, government officials well recognize that there are significant polítical, social, and technical 
constraints to targeting well. The polítical and social pressures are especially embedded and wi11 
be difficult lo alter. Officíals also admit that not targeting often results ín too little seed being 
received by the truly needy. 
3. Targeting seed aid: Farmers'perspective 
By theit range of complaints ("too little seed because too many receive"), farmen also see the targeting 
issue as a challenge that needs to be better addressed-sooner rather than later. Over 20 different eritena 
by which farmers thought the need had been targeted (or not) were given from among the 133 farmers who 
received aid (table 11). Clearly, there is need for a great deal more transparency in choosing seed-aid 
recipients; the lack of clarity is creating ftictíons withín communities. 
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Table 11: Farmer-pen:eived criteria for tbose who received seed aid in 1997: overview 
¡ l. Those belongíng lo organized fanner groups/women's groups 
2. AlI who wenl to chief's barazalall who went 10 agricultural extension meeting 
3. Those who were unable to buy own seeds 
4. Those identified by RcJiefCornmittee/ Assístant Chíet7Village Chíef 
5. Those sponsored by aíd agency(e.g., Plan Intemational) 
6. Old people/"The 'old man' (chief) then gave ihe rest 10 his sons" 
7. Farmers who adopted techníques of ~xtensíon staff 
8 Best farmers ("If she well-prepared her fann, she gol more") 
9. Onememberfrom each family 
10. All were given 
11. Fanners were gíven according to land Si7~ 
12. OnlyCatholics (refers lo church-relaled dispenser) 
13. Lis! writtcn down by Church. 11 included Catholics and non-Catholics 
14. Small [ce charged per kilo. Then Ihose who went to church and paid, received 
15. Anyone who presented himselflherself at Church 
16. Through Church Committee 
17. Fríends of distributors 
18. Seedgiven forwork 
19. Groups trained in seed-production techniques and given seed (self-help) 
20. Chosen by extension agents 
21. Farmers readyto plant, because seed came late 
22. Old widows were selected 
23. Anyone who got [ood aid received seed aid 
24. The needy and the contaet farmers 
25. Bribery 
26. The needy were chosen against land register 
Unfortunately, and particularly because the seed distribuled by !he Government is perceived to be of such 
elite or exotic quality (certitied rnaize hybrids), the general ralionale for seed aid is no! c1ear-cut for rnany. 
The notion that 'Ihe besl fanners' should gel the seed or tha! 'all citizens should gel Ihis gift' does nol tit 
well with nonnal visions of who should received seed aid in times of stress. 
Table 12 furtherrefines perceptions ofwhat types offanners received seed aid, bysile. 
In Makueni, the implementer GAA strove to give aid lo those organized inlo groups-who could 
continue to produce seed on a longer-tenn basis. 
- In Embu/Afbeere, farmcr complaints suggest Ihal Catholics were given preference and Iha! sorne 
no! deserving seed received substantial arnounts. In the zones sampled, Church leaders 
thernselves seerned unusualJywell-informed about grass-roots developments and reitera!ed 
these same targeting concerns. Well-kept Church records (name, ID, village, religion, seed 
lypes, date received) al80 noted a high proportion of recipients as Catholics. 
In ¡he GOK/,}fOA-implemented site in Machakos, fanners were unclear iftargeting went on al all 
(and rumors were rife}. 
-- In ¡he GOK/MOA -implemented si/e in Baringo (identified by the DAO), targeting seerns to ha ve 
followed distinctive and perhaps atypical critería for model or progressive fanners. 
Beyond these [armer perceptions, in section 5 we look at how important the seed aid received was to the 
beneficiaries-in tenns oftheirtotal seed planted. While therewere evídent biases in the targeting, which 
had little to do with seed need, Ihere is some evídence, partícularly at the Makueni and Embu/Mbeere sites, 
tha! the recipients were indeed among those most in need of outside seed support. 
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That ¡s, in botb ofthese siles, the seed aid deJivered accounted for a significant portion ofthe seed planted 
for tbeir staple crops (section 5). 
FinalIy, botb tbe offícial guidelines and practice oftargeting suggcst that tbe goals ofthe seed aid may be 
both varíed and unclear. This issue of'what goals for seed aid' is pursued in the concIuding discussion 
portion oftbis section. 
Table 12- Farmer-perceived criteria for those who received seed aid in 1997 - distinctive features . 
~".-r ,'" 
, Makueni EmbulMbeere Macharos Baringo 
• Seed for Work • Only Catholics • all who wenl lo chiers o Farmers who 
o Groups trained • Anyone who presenled baraza [meeling]lall adopled teehníques 
and given seed himselfl herself al Chureh who turned uplall who of exlension staff 
(self-help) o Small fee charged per hlo went lo agricultural o Exlension agenls 
o Th05e belonging • Then Ihose who wenl lo 
extension meeting choose 
lo organized • AIl were given o Bes! farmeIS: "If she 
farmer groupsl 
chureh and paid-received . o Farmers ready to prepared her farm 
• Lis! written down. It included I 
wornen's gruups 
Catholics and non-Catholics . plant-because seed 
well, she gol more" 
• Through Church 
carne late 
I 
Quantity received 
The quantity of aid received per recipient is, of course, a function ofthe total amount available and the 
number ofthose receiving any seed at alL As table 13 shows, the amounts receíved varied markedly, even 
at a single site, with Baringo having the highest divergence of I to 15 kilos ofmaize received by single 
farmers, and Makueni appearing to have the most equal distribution. 
Table 13: Malze seed aid 1997-quantity recelved 
i 
I~~~=~~~=-~~~~~~=Q~~~~=~~~-~~~~l' 
I~ _ I Makueni -1 EmbulMbeere' Machakos Baringo 
:1 Average amount per fannerwho received 3.08' 4.3 1.53 4.1 
1, tnaize aid (kg) i j' • I-----t~ ~Range among farmers al s~ngJesite (kg) , L~ 2¿1~ _~~~ 1,15 ji 
Across sites, the mrmers' biggest complaint about tbe maize received was the small quantity, with the 
number of complaints highest at Machakos, where a generalized, untargeted, government distribution took 
place. There, a cluster offarmers received almost nothing (0.1, 0.2, 0.25 kg). Indeed, there maybe costs of 
targeting well (the technical cosls ofleamingw";ch farmers need seed, as well as the polítical and social 
costs of'not giving lo all'). However, Ihere are algO substantial-'-and direct--<:osts lo no! targeling. Those 
mosl in need may receive only token help, tha! ís, not enoUgh lo make a difference to theír lack of 
agricultural viability. 
Vouchers 
Fínally, we end this sectíon on ¡he process of seed-aíd delivery by lookíng al the question of vouchers. 
Vouchers were no! used duríng the 1997 aid intervention, although they are currently being programmed in 
CRS's work for Ihe Short Rains 2000 season. 
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Overview 
While stiII within the realm of'aid,' the logic ofvouchers is based on the notion that (a) farmers are bettcr al 
decíding which crops and varieties most suit their needs and (b) farmers will normally procure, locally, the 
variety and seed material they know to be adapted to their environment. Theoretically, vouchers 8hould al80 
support, rather than undermine, the seed markets running locally (whether or no! truly local, these are open 
markets or local seed shops known as 'stockists,' which sell certified seed of cornmerciallyreleased varieties), 
While seed vouchers have been tried in Uganda by Sasakawa Global 2000, theiruse in Kenya seen1S relatively 
unknown, During the course of the interviews, farmers were asked their views on vouchers: Would they prefer 
vouchers (or cash to buy seed), or did they have a preference fOf getting the physical seed itself during 
emergency bandout operations? 
Fieldwork showed the voucher issue to pose two very different sorts of challenges and concems for farmers: 
(a) the availability ofloca! crops/varieties even if purchasing power were guaranteed and (b) the 'wm power' 
of farmers to use the cashlvoucher for seed stocks when other needs were jusI as pressing (paying school 
fees or buying basic food supplíes, such as salt, sugar, or cooking oil). It was interesting-·and surprising-
to note tha! a good number of funners did not want anything at aH for buying local seed, They voted [or the 
seed option specifically because they equate 'aid' with the certified maize hybrids delívered in govemment-
assístance programs, As mentioned abo ve, at aH sítes samp!ed, such hybrids as those froro the Kenya Seed 
Company are perceived byroany as an incredible luxury good, whích is notto be passed over (even ifone 
has enough ofhislher own seed), Table 14 quantitatively summarizes the relevance ofthese conceros by 
regíon, The variability in even such a small sample is intriguing, and qualitative insights are elaborated in the 
discussion sections be!ow, 
Table 14: As a seed-aid strategy, would farmers prefer vouchers/cash so as to obtaín desired cropsl 
varietíes themselves--or seed aíd ltself ? 
Makuení 
====,-
I MbeereiEmbu 1 Baringo (n~30) 
I 
(n=33) (n;35) (n=28) 
i Prefer 
, 
i 
I 
-.~-----~--t--
I I 
; Voucbers/Casb 13% i 58% 51% 71% 
Reasons l. can get loca! seed • can get seed • can gel certified • can get 'hígh-quality' I 
Maeh.kos 
locally-want lhe loca!1y-want maize or beans seed at stockist:rnaize, 
, 
money or voucher lhe money or from lhe stockí,!' kales, tornatoes, lrísh 
voucher can gel desired potatoes [No, 57J' 
i 
beans and eowpea 
i 
can gel seed at local 
i in local market market:watermelon, 
tti i beans [No. 14] 
I PreferSeed 
í ¡ 
i I 87% 42% 49% 29% 
Reasons • would divert • would divert • would divert cash • wou1d dívert cash for 
money for olher money for for olher purposes otber purposes [No, 7J 
purposes [No, 37] other purposes [No, 37J • can't gel righl varíety 
• rnarkets too far [No,30] • craps available in [No,4] 
[No, 33] • can'! get such market from hígh- • seed often out of stoel> 
• local seed nol certified seed potenlial areas not [No,7J 
good quality easily [No, 12] adapted [No, 6] • markets loo tar [No, 
! 
17] • market too far I!] 
[1'10,61 
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Comments on vouchers by site 
Makueni. In Makueni, farmers overwhelmil¡gly said they did not want vouchers or cash. Only 
four (13%) indicated they could gel the appropriate varieties and wanted the cash. Half 
stressed that they could not get the varieties they most desired, focusing on the govemment-
certified maize seed, which is a coveted luxuryproduct. Reinforcing this view, many also 
mentioned the significant costs incurred while traveling (that is, the market is just too far) and 
their lack offuith in the local sellers (e.g., "they mix varieties, mislabel varieties," etc). The 
remaining group (37%) glossed over the seed issues (potentially, they could purchase what 
they needed), but were simply reluctant to have the money in their pockets. Women, in 
particular, mentioned the fear of díverting needed seed money for urgently needed food and 
school fees. 
Embu/Mbeere. At Embu/Mbcere, relatively more farmers (58%) wcre predisposed lo Ihe cashl 
voucher idea. Unlike Makueni, few (12%) fell they could not get desíred seed ifthey had 
money. (They purchase local maize varietics here, as well as cowpeas, beans, etc., and have 
no speciaI attachment to the newer maíze hybrids.) However, even though sorne confirmed 
they could access seed locally, a good number (30%) did not want the cashlvoucher coupon 
as they feared using it for other purposes. This reluctance to have cash in the pocket serves as 
a rough 'informal' indicator ofpoverty andlor a lack of control over how themoney will be 
used, Some also stressed how much they appreciated having the seed aid dírectly delivered, 
rather than havíng lo walk the 10-20 km to market. 
Machakos. Farmers were equally divided over vouchers, primarily for rcasons of economics 
(not seed issues). Farmers' priority crops here were mainlymaíze and bcans, with an 
occasional cowpea fan. Desired varieties ofmaize (e.g., 511) and beans (e.g., Nyayo) are easy 
to get al stockists, wíth beans also available al the rnany open markets. Those who wanted 
seed mainly expressed concems about diverting the voucher/cash resources elsewhere. 
Baríngo. Farmers here voted primarily for the voucher/cash option, They use hybrid maize and 
commercial vegetable seeds anyway~-the same they receive from relief sources. A few didn't 
trust themselves to spend the money as targeted (and by their comments, these were probably 
the poorest among the group), 
Use of a voucher ,ll'stem: yes or no? 
Analysis ofthe responses suggests that different kinds of farmers prefer different options, based to a 
certaín extent on wealth. The very poorest prcfer seed aid because oftheir fear of díverting money and 
because the maize hybrid is beyond thcir normal reach. (Whether hybrids are appropriate for such a group 
of farmers needs to be seriously debated.) The richer farmers-a good number ofwhom receíved seed 
aid-generally feel equally disposed to the two options: hybrids are what they normally use and they have 
littlc trouble reaching the stockist. The issue of distance to market (particularly in Makueni and among the 
aged) cuts across wealth categories, as does the concem that 'quality' seed (local quality seed as well as 
certified) just ¡sn't available in local markets. In aJ";ition, in areas where the NGOs are experimenting wíth 
non-maíze optíons, farmers sometímes preferthe seed aid,just because the crops and varieties ofcrops 
tbey desire (green grams, cowpeas, millet) may nol be easily accessed. As one farmer stated, "Crops in Ihe 
market ofien come from Ihe richer agricultural zones and are not locally adapled." 
Tbe pros and cons of using vouchers are further explored in the following discussion. 
Discusslon: Internal process and effects of seed aid 
It is important to note Ihal the Govemment ofKenya and sorne ofthe NGOs have themselves previously 
commissioned studies to determine the íntemallogic oftheir seed aid (Anon. 1997; CRS-Kenya-Dri 1997). 
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One report, Monitoring ofReliefSeed Distribution (Anon. 1977), specifically saw as its objective "to visit 
selecled districts in Eastern, Central and Coast Provinces lO monitor relief distribution and ascertain !hat 
seed was received and distributed on time, in !he right varieties and reached fue intended beneficiaries." The 
conclusions were unusually frank, but not necessarily analytically framed or tsrgeted lo audiences in a way 
!hat could encourage better practice. Sorne extracts follow: 
Malindi district decided to target family holdings and give adequate seed for J acre per family-while 
mosl districts issued seed lo whoever lumed up. 
Embu-The quantity each recipient received ranged from I kg lO IOkg. This was based on the 
number of farmers lhat turned up. 
Mwingi District--The exacl numberofbeneficiaries is difficult lO ascertain as traditions in Ihe district 
diclate tha! no one can be denied seed, thus all who turned up during distribution received at leasl a 
small quantity, estimated al less Ihan 1/4 kg. 
In the discussion section following, we aim 10 reflect on [OUT central issues raised by !he previous analysis 
oflhe internal delivery of seed aid: goals, targeting, vouchers versus seed, and overall organization. 
(Discussion of'which crops and varieties' is included in section 5, where Ihe fuller farming systems are 
brought into view.) Here, we compare and contras! lessons from the four differen! sites, as well as drawing 
from the insights ofboth aid practitíoners and farmers, specífically to stirnulate more consc1ous decisÍon 
making in seed-aid program design and delivery. 
Goals oC seed aid 
The goals of giving seed aid are not very transparent ín the four cases analyzed. Based on analysis of 
practice, there seem to have been at leas! four different ones. Seed was given: 
/0 jiU a lemporary seed gap-Jor Ihe farmer lo have something lo planl 
This was mosl evident in the Embu/Mbeere case, where a variety of crops were given 
(including sorne ofthe more drought-tolerant) and where those receiving aíd were generally a 
needy group. 
lO encourage self-help. or for fanners lo achieve a self-sustaining seed-production strategy 
This was c1earest in the Makueni case, where farmers receíved traíning in irnproved seed-
production techniques, were organized into collaborative groups, and were also encouraged lo 
pul more emphasis on drought-tolerant crops. 
lo give a gift 10 constituency-polítical combined with Jarming goals 
Machakos is the type case here. Farmers' standard crops-maize and beans-were given as 
seed to all who turned up, although Ihe certified maize seed was an extra bonus for many. 
Complete lack oftargeting resulted in relatively small quantities of seed reeeived perperson. 
lo stimulate 'progressive' modern farming practices 
The Baringo seed distribution illustrates !his goal. Progressive farmers were targeted with 
hybrid maize and income-generating vegetable seeds. 
None ofthese goals is inherently negative, although the fírst two probably more closely parallel Ihe goals 
aspired to in emergency stress situations. However, the multitude of goals, and accompanyíng approaches, 
created confusion among the general population about what the seed is for, and perhaps created false 
expectations as well as unnecessary dependencies---as exemplifíed in the following farmer staternents. 
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Embu: "Seed relief aid should be given throughout the year, whether during emergency periods or normal 
periods, because there are sorne farmers who have enough land but can't make use of il because of 
financial problems. The most serious problem is the high price of seeds [an access pro b l em l· .. 
[No. 4] 
"It is very difficult lO gel seeds from the local market or any other place because ofthe price-so 
seed relief should be encouraged more." [No. 7] 
Minimally, the goals of a seed-aid operation should be transparent lo aIl (donor, implementer, fdrmer) and 
should be matched with an active stralegy lo reach those goals. In the current Kenyan situatíon, we seem to 
have hidden goals and multiple (even conflicting) expectations. 
Targetíng 
A confusion of goals necessarily translates into a muddled targeting situation, although it is difficult to say 
which ofthese precedes the olher. Further, withoul a definilion of goals beforehand, it is very hard lo judge 
the effectiveness of subsequent targeting. 
Among the siles visited, several targeting strategies have been noled. Programs such as Ihe MOA 
distribution in Machakos achieved zonal targeting: Le., everyone in the zone received aid (known as 'blanket 
distribution' or 'equi-distribution'). In the other areas, attempts were made lo target specific groups wilhin 
zones. This encompassed the more vulnerable in both the ChurchlCRS-sponsored distributíon ofEmbu! 
Mbeere and the GAA-sponsored seed prograrn in Makueni, while the MOA-sponsored program ofBaringo 
seemed to target the more progressive farmers (those with 'exemplary farming practices'). The Church 
sample had the additional targeting critcrion ofreaching Catholics. Thís may have been an oulcome rather 
lhan an explicít strategy, as prayer houses proved lo be the major channels of dissemination. 
What is clear within the Kenyan context is that lack of clear goal s for the seed aid, which leads lo unclear 
messages abou! who the beneficiarles are, could create significant fuetion among those who dispense the 
seed as well as among many ofthe recipients. There were repeated accounts of Ibe very needy receiving 
insignificant amounts. Furthermore, an overwhelming majority (95% ofthose interviewed) indicated that Ibe 
seed aid was simply "too Httle." This statement could also be interpreted as a sign ofthe increasing 
dependency and expectations offarmers on outside, 'free' support. 
In theory, Ibe targeting scenario posed in Ihis Kenya study should be a relatívely easy one technically, in Ibat 
the populations are physically stable (compared lo refugees on the move) and have Iived in Ihcir home areas 
for at least sevcml seasons. Sorne further technical parameters would need 10 he addressed: how to define 
seed-vulnerable populatíons in an emergency situation, and then how to distinguish those who are 
experiencing acute seed stress (that i8, stress just this season because of drought, for example) from those 
who are chronically seed-stressed (and require outsíde help nearlyevery season). Specific indicators and 
strategies for distinguíshing stress populations are elaborated in the complementary volume lo this report 
(workshop proceedings). 
However, many (most?) ofthe challenges in remedying targeting concems are polítical and/or social and líe 
beyond the scope ofthis study. In public distribution zones, populations hlIve been given the sense that 
seed aid is their right and a gift from the government. 
Vouchers 
The question ofvouchers might be best explored in a more analytical manner than has becn done to dale. A 
country-wide strategy lo pro mote the voucher option (or not) would, a priori, disadvantage sorne farmers. 
In arcas where stockists regularly operate and aíd givers tend to give certífied seed of major crops anyway, 
a voucher system could work well-and save money in the seed-dístributíon process. In areas where seed 
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markets function poorly (Iittle seed,little variability in crops, few reliable seed sources forwell-adapted 
crops), seed aid in the form ofseed might actually be more effective, assuming donors delíver seed of 
locally adapted crops and varietíes. Table 151ays out sorne ofthe key variables important in the decision-
making process abaut whether to gíve vouchers. 
Table 15: Weighing the pros and eoos of a voucher system-the farmers' perspective 
1m ······mm .. .. .. 
! FOR VOUCHERS as ald, If, " FOR SEED in seed aid, if ... 
! 
open marketsístockists are relatively close marketsístockists are far (or nonexistent in the 
area) 
markets/stockists deliver crops and varieties 1 want 
lo plan! markets/stockists don't stock crops/varieties 1 
need 
marketslstockists deliver good-quality seed 
trust in stockistslopen market is low 
marketlstockists have stocks in times of need 
volume of seed stocked locally is low 
---~~------*-------------
1 [farmer 1 fear 1 will divert cashlvoucher for other 
Questíon: Do stockists favor products adapted purposes 
mostly for (he more favorable zones, and of erops 
tha! tend to be more cornmercialized? 
Question: Would the voucher system guarantee the 
farmer a mínimum quantíty of seed? 
Organization: Centralized or decentralized 
Fínally, a closíng reflection on the organization ofthe seed-aid process, Even this small number of cases 
suggests that seed aid (procurement and delivery) is more effective when it is done in a decentralized 
manner, 
The choice of crops and varietíes can be tailored more to the local environment. 
- Targeting on a smaller scale is more accurate, 
¡ 
! 
- A range ofapproaches i8 possible, rather Ihan standardízed ones, ifseed aid is tied lo the actual 
cause, In sorne cases, seed alone may be needed; in others, skill buílding may prove crucial; and 
in still others, novel approaches to crops and crop management may be vital. 
The need for a greater basket of approaches rnay be clearer when we look at sorne ofthe effccts of 10 
years of seed aid, within a broader, farming-systems context in lhe next section, 
Summary: Key points 
1. Three-quarters ofthose inteTVÍewed (77 ,8%) received seed aid 1997. At GOK-managed sites, maize and 
beans were primarily given, with those al Baringo also receivíng vegetable seeds, NGO-managed sites 
also distributed maize and beans, and further distributed seed of more droughHoleranl crops 
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(cowpeas, sorghum, millet, pigeon peas }-to promote their use. The single site at Makueni 
programmed in an aid component offarmer capacity building (in improved seed production). 
2. Farmers generally assessed the crops and varieties that were given as appropriate. The more drought-
tolerant crops were also deemed 'acceptable' as long as maize is one ofthe elements in the aid package. 
Over 85% oftbe maize and bean seed was sown, witb relatively lower proportions of the cowpea and 
sorghum seed. 
3. The quality of seed given was deemed exceptional: most farmers sampled do not routinely use certified 
seed or maize hybrids (exception in Baringo). Farmers recognize tbe luxury value ofhybrids, but not 
necessarily just for direct sowing. They can exchange the packaged maize forurgentlyneeded items 
(forexample, food staples such as salt, sugar, and oil). Seed aid in this sense achieves a currency 
function. 
4. AH three proeess variables were generally deemed problematic by furmers: timing (generally late), 
targeting (not transparent), and quantities received (too littlc). The less rigorous targeting was directly 
related to lesser quantities received per furmer. Overall, the process variables were generally rated higher 
at Makueni, wbere a prior assistance program had becn cstablished. 
5. Each oflhe four sites had specific built-in biases in targeting, witb the possible exception ofthe 
govemment-managed site Machakos, wbere there seems to have been a blanket distribution for 
everyone who appeared at public meetings. Apparent biases were noted at Makueni (those who 
organi7~d into work groups), EmbulMbeere (Catholics), and Baringo (those with access lo irrigated 
plots). There was sorne evidence that poorerpopulations also were specificallyreached in Embu! 
Mbeere. 
6. Lack oftargeting transparency (i,e., 27 different--and at times conflicting-criteria cited by farmers) 
creates social frictions. At GOK-managed siles, all expect seed as part of a 'public good.' The 
fuzziness in targeting is also related lo an ambiguity in the goals set [or the seed-aid distribution (see 
point 8, below). 
7. While vouchers were no! given, exploration oftbeir potential acceptability showed farmers very divided 
as 10 theirusefulness and acceptabílity, Much depends on (a) the availability oflocal crops/varieties, 
even if purchasing powerwere guaranteed, and (b) the 'will power' of farmers lo use the cashlvoucher 
solely for seed stocks. Different kinds offarmers seem to prefer different options, based lo a certain 
extent on weallh. The very poorest prefer seed aid because of Iheir fear of diverting money and 
because maize hybrids are beyond lheir normal reach. Richer farmers--a good number ofwhom 
received seed aid-generally feel equally disposed lo the two oplions: hybrids are what theynormally 
use and lhey have littlc trouble reaching the stockist. The issues of dístances lo market (particularly in 
Makuéni and among the aged) would cut across wealth categories, as would a concem Ihat 'quality' 
seed (local quality seed as well as certified) ju" ,sn'! available in local markets. In areas where aid 
organizations are experimenting wilh non-maize options, furmers sometimes prefer the seed aid jusI 
because the crops or varieties they desíre (green grams, cowpeas, millet) may not be easily available 
otherwíse. 
8. The goals of giving are nol transparent in the four cases analyzed, with four dístinct goals emerging: 
/01ill a lemporary seed gap--for the farmer /0 have something lo plant 
lO encourage self-help or for farmers lo achieve a self-sustaining seed-produclion slrategy 
.. 10 give a gifi 10 a polítical constituency-political combined with farming goals 
.- tostimulate 'progressive'farmingpractices. 
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None ofthese goals lB lnherently negative, although the first two probably more closely parallel goals 
a.spíred 10 in emergency stress sltuatíons. However, the multitude of goals, and accompanying 
approaches, create confusíotÍ aoout what seed ls for and create false expectations as well as 
unnecesssry dependencies. 
9. Even the small number of cases suggests that seed aid (procurement and delivery) is more effective 
when decentralized: 
- The choice 01 crops and varieties can be more local and tailored to (he environment. 
- Targeting on a smaller scale is more accurate. 
- A range 01 approaches is possible, rather (han standaroized ones. In some cases, seed alone 
may be needed; in others, skill building may prove crucial; and in still others, novel 
approaches fo crops and crop management may be vital. 
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Section 4 
EXTERNAL LOGIC OF SEED AID: 
HAS IT SERVED TO STRENGTHEN FARMERS' SEED AND AGRICULTURAL SYSTEMS? 
This section looks at tbe effectiveness oftbe aid in the context offanners' bTOader agricultural-management 
strategies. It examines whetber tbe seed aid given helped fanners .. get back on their feet" and re-establish a 
sustainable mode ofaCi:essing desired seeds. To arrive at tbis longer-term perspectíve, this sectíon revíews 
fanners' history of seed aid and its relative ímportance among tbe otber seed-procurement strategies 
fanners have, during botb emergency and more TOutine agricultural periods. 
HIstory from tbe perspective of seed-aid recipients 
The introduction (section 1) gave a glimpse ofthe govemment view oftbe history of seed aid. It started on 
a large scale in 1992, and seed has becn distributed nearly every year since tben. More detail on tbe 1997 
distribution showed tbat tbe seed aid given, mostly maize, provided between 10% and 35% oftotal seed 
sown, by district. 
1ms section looks at tbe history of seed aid in Kenya from a farmer-centered perspective, witb tbe profile 
of aid delivery al four specific sites. Those interviewed (in July 1998) were asked to recaIl tbe number of 
times and type of seed aid they had received since 1992. For each fanning family, tbe donor oftbe aíd, 
crop, variery, and dates were all recorded. However, given the relatively long lime period forrecall, it ís 
Iikely tbat farmers underestimated tbe times theyreceived aid over the prevíous eight years. 
Table 16 indicates the number oftimes, since 1992, tbat fanning families received seed aid. On average, 
each famíly has received aid slightlymore tban twice, witb an impressive high of 10 times. In Machakos, 
Baringo, and Makueni, sampling oftbose intervíewed was random witbin general zones where seed aid was 
recorded to have occurred in 1997. In tbe other two areas (EmbulMbeere and Thika), lhe intennediary 
organizations contacted provided detailed lisis offanners who had supposedly received seed forthe 1997 
Long Rains season (although a number oftbe fanners on tbe lisis c1aimed not to have received seed aid). 
The lalter two samples were to loosely correJate wilh '!he poor.' 
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Table 16: Number oftimes farmers have recelved seed aid since 1992 
~._ •.. 
I SAMPLE I AVERAGE 
I MODE l IDGH I LOW , REGlON I 
46 
I 
1.8 I 2 4 O Machakos I 
1 
I Baringo 46 1.4 1 3 O 
, I 
I 
¡ 
, Makueni 33 2.2 1 5 i 1 II¡"-~----l-¡ ___ -¡---__ +--_-+-_----l-__ \I
IIEmbw'Mbeere I 40 3.1 4/3 10 1 
~'ka ±7 3 3 1 '~ 2 1 . 1 i o~~~_~_17-2-.. -. -_l--~ ... _-.-2-.1-.. -. - .. -4;-... -2·-/ -1 -.. ___ -_j~._-._-~-. -+1-. O .] 
The table indicates tha! mos! farmers, irrespective ofweaJth, have received seed aid more than once in the 
last decade. (See also the section on targeting. Officials honestiy admitted tha! politically, il is difficult not 
lo do a blankel distribution.) 
Further, many ofthe 'poor' receive seed aid once in aboul every two seasons. (Poor is indicated in 
quotation marks because conceros were raised within the Chureh sample Ihal the main eriterion 5eems to 
have been membership in a parish.) 
Several farmer quotes indicare vividly how much farmers have come lo expect agencies (government and 
nongovernmenl) 10 provide what might be considered 'emergency' aid-but on a continued basis. s 
Furtherrnore, the recurrent (ralher than acule, one-oft) nature of problems is also well recognized by 
fimners. 
In Embu, farmers commenled 
Seed aid should be given throughout the year, whelher during emergency periods or normal periods, 
because sorne fanners who have enough land can't use it because of financial problems. The mosl 
serious problem is the high price ofseeds. [No. 4] 
Sometimes Ihe aid comes when farmers don't have cash to buy seeds Ihat give good yields. [No. 18] 
lt is very difficult to get seeds from the local markel or any olher place because ofthe prices. So 
seed relief should be eneouraged more. [No. 10] 
In Machakos, one farmer added further 
The MOA should train people lo edueate farmers on how lo preserve seeds for plant1ng, how lo 
improve Ihem instead ofbuying seed and waiting for aid every time. [No. 54] 
An example from another region reinforces what was found wilhin Ihis study: fanners have become 
dependent on seed aid in ¡he sense tha! they expect il lo come, and have altered their seed strategies 
aceordingly. One farmer in Ihe Tana Distrie!, when asked wha! his procuremenl strategywould be if seed 
aid were nol given, commented, "Oh, thal would never happen." (T Remington, CRS, personal 
cornmunication, 1998). 
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Importance oC seed ald 1997 among farmers' overall procurement strategles 
Government records ror Ihe Long Rains 1997 indicatethat aid seed accounted ror about 100/.-35% ofthe 
seed sown in the regíon8 ror which data were provided to Ihe Office ofthe President (table 2). This view 
&om Ihe top down, however, looks quite dlfferent ftom Ihal expressed ftom bottom-up, Ihat ls, ftom the 
view oflhe individual farming family. Thi5 family-centered perspeclive i8 explored OOlow. 
In the course of extended interviews, farmers listed the full range of sources ftom which they procured 
seed forthe Long Rains 1997. Across the board (thal is, across farmers and crops) farmers Iisted seven 
main sources for obtaining seed: 
seedaid 
home-saved 
local market 
slockisl 
extensionist 
relatives 
other 
gíven in emergencyaid (ftom church, NGO, government) 
saved ftom the previous harvest and stored within the homestead 
bought &om open markets or local shops that stock grain and seed (often a mix 
ofboth). Genetically, tbis may include local varíeties and improved varieties tbat 
are circulated through markets (such as self-pollinated beans, OPV maize) 
procured ftom specialízed input-supply shops Ihat carry certified seed, fertilizers, 
pesticides, etc. 
supplied by govemment agent who normally promotes varieties coming ftom 
research andlor private sector 
gíven (usuallyas gifts) by c10se relatives 
a mixed bag of anything else tha! happens on an irregular basis:e.g., picked ftom 
abandoned field. 
These sources are obviously among those for procuríng seed of their two main crops, but to varying 
degrees. Maize and beans are very different in terms of seed issues. Hybrid maize in Kenya has been 
heavily prcmoted by both the govemment and prívate sector (Hassan and Karanja 1997) and, if planted 
according 10 recommendations, should be totally renewed each season. Hybrid maize can potentially be 
accessed by most farmers at the smalllocal stockist shops-all they need is money. Improved varieties of 
beans have also been developed byrcsearch (e.g" Mwezi Moja, Mwitamania). However, they are less 
readily available from Ihe formal seed sector and, as a self-poJlinated crop, OOans can be resown season 
after season (with sorne disease limitations), even usíng the new varietal materials. 
Tables 17 and 18 show how farmers accessed their maize and bean seed for the Long Rains of 1997. Seed-
aid maize, which was the Iion's share ofaid given, provided 14% ofthe total maize sown, while aid for 
beans reached 11 % ofthe total. 
The situation for sorghum and cowpea (tables 19 and 20) was slightlydi fferent, as aid agencies most often 
gave Ihis crop expressly lo. díversify the farmers' crop profile (that is, to promote more drought-tolerant 
crops in arcas where farmers were slill concentrating resources on their cheríshed maize and beans). Aid 
seed for Ihese minority crops, therefore, proved more significant in relation lo the total sO-wn. 
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Table 17: Importance ofmaize seed aid to Carmers' overall seed-proeurement strategy, Long 
Ralns 1997 (N=91 farmers) 
'1
1 
SEED SOURCE I KG I .;. OF SEED PR~URED-)~ 
If-: -se-ed-a-id-~----iiC----~ 257.1 --1==14.1. .~J 
I Home-saved I 464.& I 25.4 ~ 
) Local market I-·~~ __ ·-_.'.~~_::_:_:: _______ --+I__ ::':--1, 
,1 Relatíves 80.2 ,4.4 
'1 Extension .~-,-- 5.5 .~:r--i ___ 0_.8 ___ ~1 
Ir~-o-. ~-A-.. L ~, -. -::._.-,:~-_II-_-._.-_,-_-_.~-,_-_~. _ ,:7°4-------1'1- ,~ j 
Table 18: Importance ofbean seed ald to farmers' overall seed-procurement strategy, Long 
Ralns 1997 (N= 43 farmers) 
f--~-~~~-I-~~--~~~~~~~~--~-~-~-~~=~~-~-I: SEED SOURCE I KG % OF SEED PROCURED ~ I Seedaid ! 109.9 lU: ------..-J'f---- "-, , 
,1 Home-saved 31.9 
I'f~--~----+----------------+--'-----_.-
, Localmarket 481.0 48.6 .-1 
Stockíst 41.0 4.1 ~ 
'-------+---------------.f----I Relatíves 38.2 3.9· I 
I Extension 4.0 0.4 1, 
L:AL == 989.1 ====,~~ 100 --_-,--Ij 
315.0 
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Table 19: Importance of sorghum seed aid to farmen' overall seed-proeurement strategy, Long 
Ralns 1997 (N=34 farmers) 
=. ~. .. .. . . 
II SOURCE KG % OF SEED PROCURED 
I Seedaid 85.9 I 32.7 
Home-saved 46.5 17.7 
, 
Local market 121.0 48.6 
Stockist 4.0 1.5 
Relatives 3.5 1.3 
Extension 2.0 0.7 
Other 
- -
I I TOTAL 262.9 99.9 
Table 20: Importance of eowpea seed aid lo farmers' overaU seed-proeurement strategy, Long 
Rain. 1997 (N-29 farmen) 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
:1 
ji 
11 
11 
1: 
= 
% OF SEED PROCURED ti I SEED SOURCE KG 
Seedaid 56.4 26.6 
I Home-saved 17.0 8.0 
i 
Local market 56.0 26.4 
Stockist 6.0 2.8 
Relatives 40.0 18.9 
Extension 95 4.5 
Other 27.0 12.7 
TOTAL 211.9 99.9 
'== 
.• . . . . •. 
These tables show that during the emergency perlod, farmers accessed the majority oftheir seed by 
themselves for all fOUT crops analyzed: maize, beans, sorghum, and cowpeas. 
.. = 
Also clear is the central importance oflocal markets (not stockists) for accessing seed, even more than 
home-saved stocks, Note that the source local markets proved to be the most importan! even during a so-
called ecologically stressed periodo 
:1 
I 
I 
i 
I 
, 
Finally, table 21 homes in on the central question that an aid agencymight ask: How many farmers reHed on 
seed aid for 100% ofthe seed sown of a particular crop? Would there have been farmers who would have 
had no seed in the absence of a seed-aid intervention? 
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Table 21: Farmers who relied 00 seed aid for 100% of tbe seed sowo oC a givco crop, Loog 
Ralos 1997 r ~ T~ J_-_~_MB_=3_··~_)fMB _ ··_EE_R_····E_·---t-i ~_=_~_5) __ ·_o_s--rI_~_~_~_·~~_) ~ -1 
i ALL CROPS . 66% 61% 14% 29%. --+---_.~ 
Staple crops 3% 
versus 
More novel crops 
24% 0% 
14% 
sorghum 
7% 
i 
63% 
millet 
cowpea 
sorghum 
36% 
minet 
cowpea 
sorghum 
: OVERALL: 8% for staple crops; 31 % for novel crops 
21% 
inrome-
generating 
vegetables j 
Table 21 suggests, at first glance, that seed aid seems to have becn importan! for an impressive number of 
farmers, varying from 14% to 66% who used it for 100% oftheir crop ateach site. However, a closer 
analysis, by crop, shows that only six farmers (one al Makueni and five at Embu) relied 100% on seed aid 
for their key crops-that is, those in which they thernselves normally invested_ For most farmers, seed aid 
supplied their full seed stocks ofa given crop only ifthe crop were relativelynew or lowerpriority, as in the 
case of cowpeas, sorghum, pigeon peas, millet, or the income-generating vegetables such as onions, kale, 
and tomatoes. 
Would farmers have endured severe seed shortages had seed aid been not given? From OUT sample, the 
evidence is far from conclusive and veers towards a 'no.' However, this reflectíon should be tempered by 
the importance of aid to the EmbulMbeere sample, which, by several parameters, was more focused on the 
peorer agricultural segments. 
Farmen' agricultural and seed systems: What is normal (i.e., a non-emergency period)? 
It i5 hard to judge how abnormal any situation is unless one understands how things operate in more routine 
times. This basíc, even banal, reflection, seems to have been consistently overlooked in shaping the large 
majority of seed-aid interventions lo date---<:crtainly those going on in Kenya in the last 10 years. To-date, a 
simple línkage has been made: when harvests are sHghtly lower, maybe even cut in half, give filrmer8 seed 
aid-immediately! There has becn HUle or no effort 10 examine the resiliency of fimners' agricultural or 
secd systems, or to question whether physically giving farmers secd i8 the best among several potential 
5trategies (altcrnatives including, forexample, giving farmers vouchers to access seed themselves, or 
subsidizing local-rnarket seed prices for a period oftime). Seed is given without diagnosing what the 
constraint may be, or whether there is a seed constraint (aside frorn the faet that the harvest of a given crop 
rnay be lower than normal). This lack of diagnosis and )ack oflinderstanding ofthe seed system itself is 
particularly flagrant in a situation such as Kenya, where seed aid has been given sorne lOor more out of 16 
consecutive seasons. 
In this section, we take a broader víew and examine farmers' curren! 'routine' agricultural strategíes: What 
are the priority crops? How is seed for these crops normally accessed? Sorne the key changes farmers 
perceive as hindering or enhancing seed systems over the last decade are also considered. 
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Priority crops 
Fanners desígnated theír priority crops at each ofthe four sites, using their own key critena (tables 22 to 
24). As always, maize carne first across sites and then beans, despite the important differences among 
Canners' own agricultural conditions (sorne having access 10 írrigation, sorne not). This access to or lack of 
wateris reflected more in their thírd choice of crop. Those without supplemental water (al! but Baringo) 
were íncreasíngly ínterested in the more drought-tolerant crops, while those belonging 10 írrigated schemes 
(Baringo) were experirnenting with vegetable gardening (Cor sale al town and uroan rnarkets). 
Table 22: Prlority crop l-farmers' assessments at each site (% oUarmers) 
fROP . I 
. 
I Makuení EmbulMbeere Machakos :~ (N=30) (N=33) (N=35) 
'f7 'f7 91 
" 
, 
Beans 9 
jSorghum 
1, Mine! 
I 
3 
Ilcowpea 
.• 
3 
'i Pígeon pea 
I Greengram 
, 
, 
,,...... . .-
, Onions I J KalelCabbage : , 
, 
'Tomatoes 3= ±= 
11 OtherCo~;rcíal Veg~~~l~~~-__ = •. 
...... ~. --~.~. 
Table 23: Prlority crop 2-farmers' assessment8 at each site (% of Carmers) 
Machakos 
(N=35) 
9 
r Baringo 
(N=28) 
100 
I 
, 
·1 
, 
I 
, 
L J 
=. ~= 
Baringo 
(N=28) 
,Beans 67 .. -- 79 ' 91 ~M~:~um ---... - .. ----3---1---
33
---'1, -._-_.--+-.- ---.-~--4!1 
c:ea -----+-~~-1-7---+-·-·--·-27·---+-· ----~~ 
Pigeon pea .~=---l---:,-" -·~--+-"""'-·.-_·_-·~~====·_-.f..·========--+·I--_--III 
i Green grarn i 3 9 : 
1) Onions --.-.--l·~--.. ·===~:I ~_ ... ==========:========= .. ==:=====-~==:: 
KalelCabbage j 
Tomatoes i 4 
Other cornmercial I 
Banana : 7 
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Table 24: Prlority Crop 3: Farmer assessments at each ,Ite ("lo of farmen) 
t:--··-· ______ -+_~:_=3_~.:....),___'I_E_mb_'_·~_.33) ~l ";~~ I = ] 
~. --~--------~---------_T-----~II 
• Beans 10 6 14 ~----------~-------~'----------~i--------------r' --------------r--------~' 
,] Sorghum ! 3 i 24 11: 1: 
i Kale I Cabbage : : '3 14 
!Tomato i i i 
I;-.----------t----··-·--,---------r' --------+------il 
3 ~ercommercial vegetables I
1 
I Potato. 7 
,1-1 C_a_ssa __ va ________ . ___ +-_, _____ -¡1 _______ -L_ .. __ 9_._,---t ___ 14_--I 
I Banana 3 I 36 
• Watermelon 4 
7 
Wbcn fuese priority crops are matched against whal was actually given (table 25), we see thal according lo 
Ihe farmerg' views, Ihe crops gíven as aid malched lo a largc extenl [armers' own crop priorities. 
Overwhelmingly, farmers received al least one oflhe crops they considered mosl importan!. This issue of 
Ihe 'right' crop is explored-and debated-in section 5, 
Table 25: Farmers' assessments ofwhetber seed aid given in 1997 comprised crops valued 
among thelr tbree top priority crops (% offarmers) 
Makuerú 
(N=28) 
. i EmbulMbeerelMachakosl Baringo 1I 
(N=30) i (N=33) i (N=27) I 
.¡:I cropsdistributed we~e priority* ---+---2-7--+-- 52J_7_7 =r, .. 78 ' 
!¡50% ofcrops dislributed (or 1 out of2) 1 i 
'1 were among the three top priority ! 57 45 I 9 I 
i None ' 173--·· I 14 i 
l ' , .. L .. =~====...~=_ 1 
7 
Description offarm¡:rs' mutine seed-procurement strategíes 
Farmers also offered insights into their normal strategies for accessing seed fOf their key crops of maize 
and beans. Their sources were described, along with the ftequency seed was procured off-farm and the 
relative amounts procured !Tom off-farm sources. Getting botb !Tequency and relative amounts ís important 
for understandíng fanners' opportunitíes and constraínts. A farmer who gets most ofher bean seed off-
farm every season may be financiaJly stressed, eatíng her fuJl harvest before tbe next sowíng. This is very 
díffcrent !Tom a farmer who may seek a handful of seeds every season to test new varieties. 
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1, Maize 
Farmers' routine strategies for procuring maize are summanzed in tables 26 lhrough 28, Except for lhe case 
ofBaringo, nearly all farmers regularly use home-saved maize seed (kernels harvested lhe season before) 
and al80 regularly use the local market to top-off supplies, Use of stockist seed (that is, lhe use of 
improved varieties and of certified seed) 18 near universal only in lhe Baringo sample, allhough between 
one-quarter and a third of farmers in Machak08 and EmbulMbeere claim to use it ·occasionally.' Offarmers 
sampled in Baringo, generally 100% use a stockist for acquiring seed; 89% use a stockist every sea son; and 
about 78% use a stockist lO renew all ofthcir seed, This is a very different scenario from those sampled in 
Makueni, There, very few farmers ever access maize seed from a stockist (6%), relatively few get maize 
off-farrn every season (20%), and when theydo, ilis notusually 100% oflheirneeds (only 13.3% of 
farmers gel 100% oftheir seed off-farm), 
Table 26: Maize--farmers' normal proc:urement Bounes for seed ('Yo of farmen citlng source) 
'~ , , '1 MakUeni " '1 E~bulMbeére 'r' MÍlclÍakós' '1 'Baringo:] 
~ur~ ___ ~~=~O) ___ '~, _~.:33)_---+ (N=35) : (N=28) 1I 
: Home_~_ : 97 _ ¡ lOO +-__ 100 __ ~ __ ~~_~1 
¡l Local Mar~(lt ____ ~,_...§~ ___ +----6l..----+---.21-----l,----------ll 
ILStocki~ __ ,,_+ 6 I 25, + __ ..J,'~----~---~~-,--. 1 
l1!.elatlves -=~_l-.. 13 , 12 L.. .. _17 , ! ,,- , __ J 
Note: Numbers do not rally to 100% because a single farming family may use multiple sourees during the same 
seascn for getting different proportions of their seed, Further, in sorne seasons, eertain sourees are more 
importanl than others, 
Table 27: Frequency (Carmen' estimates) of accessing malze sud off-farm ('Yo of farmers al site) 
~=~---4~;;T~;;;-~ M= i ~r,l 
I[ EveIYseason ,,20 9 1: 20 ' 89 1  
:1--- " '-t 1: 
il One in 2 or3s.:~~ons 60 67 i· 66 I 11 ~¡ 
Lessfrequen:ly I 20 18 -+ 9 " -JI 
OnlYin(\r.<'Ug~_-+ 3 -+---~--t --Ji 
~ Never ~, 3 I - J ] 
Table 28: Farmers' estlmates of pereent of maize seed acquired offfarm when an off-farm 
source Is accessed 
Peleent Makueni Embu!Mbeere Machakos Baringo I seed p . 
I farm (N=30) (N=33) (N=35) (N=28) 
, 
100 13,3 I 38 20..0 77.8 
70-99 10.0 ! - 17,1 3,7 
50-69 40,0 38 34.3 11.1 
20-49 30,0 22 22,9 7,4 
Under20 6,7 3 5.7 
-
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Qualitative insights from Ihe different siles further differentiate among fimners' concems and constraints in 
reference to Ihe maize cmp. Agaín, we use Makueni and Baringo as examples ofthe more extreme. 
In Makueni, fimners highlight Iheirvery vulnerable farming conditions. They describe frequent dmughts in 
Ihe area, with mutine Iy poor maize harvests. F armers use home-saved seed except when it is losl to 
drought, and then they buy from the local market. Even local market secd is deemed expensive: fimners 
rarely use a stockist Stockist slores are few and far between in Makueni, and many farmers feel the 
improved varieties on offer are not aclapted to their rocal growing condítions. Verytellingly, two out ofthe 
30 farmers interviewed listed "emergency aid maize secd" among their routine sources of secd 
procurement. 6 
In Makueni, the message was Ihe same, again and again: 
bul 
When rains are low, maize is lost·-we buy seed from local marke!. [No. 130) 
We prefer home-saved seeds, so we can save money for other purposes [school fees, foodJ. The 
qualityofseedsboughlisunknown. [No.136J 
In Baringo, the scenario described for acquiring maize is quite different. Clearly, those with access lo 
irrigation want hybrids and certificd seed-and are prepared lo pay for it 
Farmers comment: 
Only poor people use home-saved seeds. [No. 113] 
Seed aid saves us money. It reduces the costs ofour having lo buy from the slockist. [No. 146] 
Further, in the Baringo sample, the agricultural jargon common lo both extension agents and 'model 
farmers' was repeated fairly frequently: 
My farming has improved and through seed aid I have been encouraged how to do furming 
properly-I know which plants lo use, how many seeds lo pul per hole, and Ihe corree! lime lo sOW. 
[No. 112]. 
These very different contexts--irrigatedlprogressive practices in Baringo and rainfedllocal routines in 
Makueni-are not sufficiently refiected in government seed strategies in these regions. They al! gel maize, 
with modifications only in the choice ofvariety. 
2. Beans 
The case ofbeans is different from maize. As beans are self-poJlinated, farmers potentially have more 
control over their seed supplies: Iheycan resow a small portion ofwhat Ihey harvest. Tables 29, 30, and 31 
summarize furmers' strategies for procuring bean seed. Across sites, home-saved stocks are a central 
source of secd. However, local markels appear as an equalIy used source. Given Iha! bean secd can be 
easily selected out from Ihe previous harvest, it is surprising how many fanners gel bean seed off-farm 
every season or every olher season (about 30% across the sites)-and how much-most furmers (70% 
plus) gel more than halftheir seed off-fann on a regular basis. Complaints were rampan! aboul the low 
quality oflocal market seed, so (he varieties and secd they get off-fann are certainly no! better than what 
they harvesl themselves. This unusualIy high amounl ofbean seed accessed off-farm is an index of poverty 
(no! ofprogressive farmers improving their seed). Note tha! in the Machakos sample, sorne fanners 
routinely listed emergency seed aid as a source ofbeans, while others highlighled theiruse offood slores 
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fur bean seed. Note aloo lbat in the descriptions for both maize and beans, fanners felt they could rarely gel 
seed from relatives. 
Table29: Bean-rarmen' normal proeurement sonrees for seed (% farmen cltlng sonree) 
r:= ~ .. ~ - ~ . .. . j Makueni EmbulMbeere Machakos ~ I Source (N=20) (N=20) (N=35) (N=:' . Homesaved 100 94 77 91 I 
i 
1\ Local market 
i 
95 83 97 86 
i i 
Stocldst - 6 6 14 I 
Relatives 10 22 ¡ 9 5 (neighbors) li 
I Extension: 6 l' Other i I L FoodAid: 6 .,J .~ ~ ~ ~ .. .~ ~ , ~ ~ . . 
Table 30: Frequency (farmen' estimates) of accesslng bean seed off-farm (% offarmers by site) 
!~reque~cy .. ~~ . .. ~ .. ~. . . ~ r ~~ 11 Makuení EmbulMbeere Machakos (N=20) (N=22) (N=35) 
:i 
1: Every Season 40 22 37 27 
IOne in 2~ ; seasons . ~._- i 45 39 51 I 50 
Less frequently 15 39 I 11 18 
I 
I Only in drought - - I - -
=t --I Never 5 i . - . J L. . . 
Table 31: Bean: farmers' estimates oC pereent olbean seed acqnired off-farm durlng 'normal' 
season (when off-farm acquisition takes place) 
__ o
. 
Pereen! of seed 
procured off·fann 
I 100 
I 70·99 
f-~ -~._. 
i 
-
-
~ .~ 
! 
Makueni 
(N=20) 
40 
20 
Embu/Mbeere T 
(N=18) 
---
39 
43 
Machakos 
(N=35) 
23 
r ~~ 
9 
For both maize and beans, tbe data shown above contradict was is often taken as a truism when describing 
furmer seed systems: lhat 'normal' farmers use about 80% oftheir seed !rom their own stocks and thal 
accessing off-farm secd sources is 'abnormal' (Cooper .1993). The Kenyan material shows that small 
furmers routinelyrely on local markets for seed. Similar in-depth secd studies in three other African 
countries (Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo) also show Ihat smallholder 
furmers rely heavily on markets for bean seed, a self-pollinatcd crop (Sperlíng el al. ¡ 996). Perhaps in sorne 
'good ole days' farmcrs were self-sufficient in Iheir inputs, but certainly not now. This observation has 
important implications for action: ensuring lbat local markets can deliver good-quality seed may be as 
important as increasing the farmers' ability to produce more seed inputs oftheir O"-'D. 
AssessmenvReflection: Farmers' routine procuremenl strategies 
lt is one thing for an outsider to comment on Kenyan farmers' high use oflocal markets (and a 
commerciany oriented assessor might scorn their lack ofuse ofstockists). However, more relevant is how 
farmers themselves reflect on the adequacy oftheír 'routine' seed-procurement strategíes. How do they see 
lhe trends ofthe last decade, and what do farmers themsel ves hope for? 
In the case of maize, farmers overwhelmíngly expressed unhappiness with tha waythey get maize seed-
again, wilh Ihe notable exception ofBaringo where Ihe 'progressive' sample accessed seed from stockists 
(table 32). For the large rnajority, sorne maize seed is home-saved and sorne is bought!rom local markets; 
relatives give littlc support. Farmers cannot afford certified seed, find the prices exorbitanl, and, as in many 
seed studies (e.g., David 1996; Sperling el al. 1996), complain about Ihe local market-the right varieties 
not available, seed peor quality, merchants cheating on quantity, and the distance. This widespread 
dissatisfaction secms serious for a crop Ihat forms the core oftheir agriculture. 
Table 32: Farmers satisfied witb tbeir rontine maize seed-procurement strategy? (% of farmees) 
~RESPÓNSE~ . T Makuenil . EníbuIMbeere Machakos '1-' Baringo ' :. i (N=30) . i (N~33) __ L __ ~=3~L_~ ___ ~=~~)_~J i YES . 30 . 39 I 17 I 64 ! Wo~~-_ ----::--i--70--T-·-·-61-----¡ ---~8y---+--_ 3.6--~, 
There have been vigorous efforts to promote the use of improved maize varieties and practices among all 
furmers-to achievewhat is sometimes called 'Africa's emergingmaize revolution' (Byerlee and Eicher 
1997). Yet, a widespread analysis from a nationwide Kenyan survey in 1992-93 showed benefits accruing 
moslly to larger-seale fimners and farmers in higher potentiaJ zones, rather than smallholders (Hassan and 
Karanja 1997): "farmers' major reasons for not using improved seed were that an appropriate variety was 
lacking, seed was expensive, or they were unaware ofimprovcd seed. The reasons limiting farmcrs' 
adoption offertilizer includcd ¡Is expense and unavailability" (Hassan et alforthcomíng, as cÍted in Hassan 
andKaranja 1997:p. 84). 
Do farmcrs in our sample see the trend as improving? Apparently no!. Sorne ofthc more detailed 
comments, using an example from Machakos, suggestjust the oppesite: "yíelds are decreasing, prices are 
going high, and former exchange networks no longerfunction as well" (table 33). Should this rhetoric just 
be attributed to 'old people complaining about bettertirnes'? Within om sample, discontent is simply too 
widespread to he writlen off so easily. 
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Table 33: Chaoges In farmers' maize seed-procuremeot strategy lo the last 10 years? 
.. 
I ~' RESPONSE Makueni Embu!Mbeere Machakos i 
IIYES 
(N=30) (N=33) 
I 
(N=35) 
I 
(N=28) I 
15 36 26 
.. 64 ... , 
.1 NO m 85 64 ... - 74 361 
Table 34: Machakos--Cbaoges in farmers' milize seed-procuremeot strategy in the last 10 
years? (N=35 farmers) 
RESPONSE COMMENTS 1, 
YES 26% 
For Worse: 20% 
Yields going down; farm size decreasing 
Stocks used lo lasl 3 months, now only one 
i Used lo be able to exchange seed, now have to buy 
No ¡onger buy certifíed seed, has become too expensíve I 
For Better: 6% 
i Can get seed in smaller packets 
Change in varieties: now have Katumani and Makuení ¡, 
NO 74% 
Mosl complain of cyc1e: poor harvest, not enough seed, eal sorne, buy off-farm, ; 
market seed poor qualíty, certified secd much too expensive i 
For bean-seed acquisition, farmers' sentiments are strong and clear across sites (table 35). The large 
majorily find themselves heavily tied to the local market-spending money but no! sure ofthe qualily they 
are receiving. Sorne in Machakos even complain of not plantíng land (the alleged scarce production factor 
for smallholders) because oflack of seed. (A kílogram ofbean seed can easily cover a 10m by 10m plol). 
Because íl is self-pollinated, farmers generally regard bean seed as somelhing lhey shouldn't have lo buy, 
using lhe money for sehool, medicine, and food inslead. Overall, lhe 'average farmer' wants self-sufficiency 
in bean seed. She wants lO save seed money, to save transport getting seed, and she wanls the seed on 
time--all implying Ihal home-saved seed is the way to go. 
Table 35: Farmers satisfied witb their routine bean seed-procurement strategy? ('Yo of farmen) 
[!ESPONSE ... m \..... ••• M~eni .. ¡. . .. EmbulMbeere =1=' """,i" ' ' --", - I 
I~v---...... . ... ~(N=20~ .... _~ ... (N3=318l.~.. .. (N=35)L(N=22) I 
I~S i 25 . 6 I 36 i [lI0 .. i .. 75 . 67 mm ••• --=9,r-.~---64-~-
Have bean-procurement strategies changed over lhe last 10 years? Farmers' assessments are even more 
damning for beans tban formaize (table 36). Again, taking an éxample from Machakos, lhere are concrete 
reasons for farmers' overall disconten!. The onlypositive move in lOor so years seems to have been lhe 
availability of one or two new varieties. 
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Table 36: Cbanges in farmen' bean seed-procurement strategy in last 10 years? 
¡RESPONSE 
--~-
! Makueni 
! 
EmbulMbeere Machakos Baringo 
, 
(N=20) (N=18) (N=35) (N=22) 
I¡YES 5 I 27 6 14 
NO 95 
: 
73 94 86 
Table 37: Machakos-Changes iu farmen' beau seed-procuremeut strategy in the last 10 yean? 
(N=35 farmers) 
, RESPONSE 
YES 
NO 
COMMENTS 
23% 
For Worse: 20% 
Land is, veryvísíbly, deteriorating 
Land available now much less (land fragmentalíon) 
Used to be able lo exchange seed, now have to buy 
Used lo save seeds, now have to buy 
Used lo be able lO buy seed, now cannol afford il 
I For Bett~~!~new varielies 
Change in varielies 
77% 
, Land has degenerated. They are now foreed to huy bean seed. Rains are 
, unreliable; they get low harvesls, have high storage losses, and eal aH the seed. 
i Cycle starts again. 
Takíng a broad sweep, table 38 surnmarizes al1 the key trends fanners cíted in !enns of seed acquisition 
over the las! 10 years, across crops and sites. Although simplified, the table sends a powerful message. 
The Kenya smal1holder fanning systems are very strelched. Giving seed here and there does little bul apply 
a band-aid (and maybe ineffectívely) lo a much bigger problem. 
Table 38: Farmer seed-strategy changes-General reflections, last 10 years (N=134) 
fGATN~CHAN?ES POSITNE CHANGES I 
11 !!. land fragmentationlreduced fann size • sorne new varíeties 
.. no longer produce enough home seed • can buy seed in smaller packets ¡; 
l' " deteríoration of fertility 
¡I" seed príces goíng up • now we have churches and intemational organízalíons giving seed aíd i, 
I~~ longer can exchange seed with neighbors • farrners learo how to produce better seed 1; 
1 .... ......... .. .. .... . . ..... [GermanAgro-ActionJ. I .... 
----------= 
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Dlscusslon: Externa] ]ogic of seed ald 
This section has documente<! the relative unimportance oC sced aid in fanners' overall seed-procurement 
strategies during an emergency periodo Perhaps the quantities of seed aid gíven were too little (o make a 
dent (as farmers complained), or perhaps farmers really needed líttle outsíde help for seed, knowing how 
and where to access it and with Iimited financial means were able to do so. In both cases, a very expensive 
seed-aíd operation proved not to be a critical elernent in farmers' accessíng seed for 1997. 
The data also confront the myth that normal smallholder farmers save most oftheir seed and only turn lo 
outside sourees when very stressed. Local markets have long been equally important in topping off 
supplies and adding new varieties-for the very poor who have lo restock each season, as well (Sperling 
and Loevinsohn 1993). Local markets, themselves, need to become a more central focus of development 
efforts, to ensure that a diversity of varielíes, locally adapted varieties and crops, and quality seed can be 
purchased locally. This ímpHes íncreased work on local-Ievel seed production, distríbution, and marketing. 
It also implies that research must lake a much more aggressive role in working with farmers to develop 
10callyadapted varieties thal combine productíon gains with desired quality traits. These issues are 
explored again in seclion 5. 
Finally, this external perspectíve on seed aid has documenled the general vulnerability offarmers' seed 
systems and overall agricultural systems. Farmers in both acule stress (drought) and routine times are 
heavi1y tied lo purchasing large amounts ofseed, even Ihe self-pollinaled types, and mainly choose lo do so 
at local markets. There have been few positive developments lo support their seed systems over the last 
10-years-jusI a new variety here and there. 
There is no concrete evidence that seed aid,per se, is strengthening farmer syslems. Those who have 
received it once are not necessarily less likely lo receive it again. The amounts gíven were no! significant in 
the context offarmers' overall seed-procurement strategíes. Furthermore, the main crop given-hybrid 
maize-does not ensure that farmers can become less dependent on outside sources: it performs only in 
favorable conditions and has a built-in deterioration factor. Al best, the seed aid has served as a temporary 
stop-gap mcasure for the very needy. Considering Ihat it trea!s but a symptom, and rnaybe no! in the most 
effective way, seed aid (seed-and-Iools), as being currently delivered, seems lo be a rather costly 
inlervention. These issues are pursued in section 5. 
Summary: Key Points 
l. Since 1992, on average, each farming family has reccived seed aid twice, with a high of 1 O times. Thus, 
most farmers, irrespective ofweaJth, have received seed aid more than once in the last decade. Those in 
the 'church sample' (Embu/Mbeere), who correlated more closelywith poorer segments ofthe 
population, received seed aid about once in everytwo seasons. Farmer comments suggest that many 
have come to expect 'emergency' aid on a continued basis. 
2. Seed aid ofmaize, which was the Hon's share ofaid given, provided 14% ofthe total maize sown in 
Long Rains 1997, while forbeans, aid seed represented 11 % ofthe total sown. The situatíon for 
sorghum and covl!pea was slightly different, as aid agencies mos! often gave these crop expressly lo 
diversif'y fanners' crop profiles in more drought-prone areas. Aid seed forthese minority crops 
accounted for 33% and 27% ofthe total seed sown for sorghum and cowpea, respectively. Thus, 
during the ernergency period, farmers accessed the rnajority oftheir seed bythemselves for all four 
crops analyzed: maize, beans, sorghum, and cowpeas. Across crops, a large portion of seed was 
sourced from local markets, not stockists, even in ecological\y stressed areas. 
3. The research assessed the portíon offarmers relyíng on seed aid for 100% oftheir seed so\vn during 
the Long Rains 1997. Overall figures varied from 14% lo 66% offarmers at each síte. However, a 
closer analysis by crop shows that only six farmers (in total across sites) relíed 100% on seed aid for 
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Ihe key crops in which Ihey Ihemselves nonnally invest. F or mos! farmers, seed aid supp lied Iheir full 
seed stocks of a single crop only iflhe crop were relativeIynew or lower priority-as in Ihe cases of 
cowpea, sorghum, pigeon pea, and míllet--{)r an income-generating vegetable such as onion, kale, and 
tomato. 
[1 ne case study explored farmers' routine crop and seed-procurement strategies so assess how 
'abnormal' Iheir practices were during Ihe designated emergency. The following summarypoints refer to 
analysis ofmore normal periods. To-date, seed i1id has been given wilhout diagnosing what Ihe 
constraint may be. There has also been little effortto examine Ihe resiliency offilrmers' agricultural or 
seed syslems, or lo question whether physically giving farmers the seed is Ihe bes! among several 
potential strategies.) 
4. Across sites, farmers primarily assessed their top two priority crops as maize and beans, wilh sorne of 
the more drought-tolerant crops cited in third place at nonirrigated sites and the income-generating 
vegetables cíted where water supplies were more reliabIe. The matching offilrmers' prioritíes with what 
they received as aid showed, overwhelmingly, lhat farmers received at leasl one ofthe crops Ihey 
consider most important. [The issue ofthe 'right crop' during normal versus emergency periods is 
debated in section 5.] 
5. Farmers used sorne seven potentíal channels for aceessing seed. For maize, nearlyal1 farmers regularly 
use home-saved maize seed as their main source and, also, regularly use the local market to top-off 
supplies. Use of stockist seed, Ihat is, use of improved varieties and of certified seed, is key only in tbe 
Baringo sample, although between one-quarter and a third offarmers in Machakos and EmbulMbeere 
c1aim lo use it 'occasionally.' Certified seed and hybrids are rarely used in MakuellÍ. This overwhelming 
predominance ofloeal maize seed perseveres in Ihese drought-striken areas in a context ofvery 
vigorous and prolonged govemment efforts to promote hybrid and eertified material. 
6. For beans, acros8 sites, filrmers use home-saved stocks as Iheir centrsl souree for seed. However, local 
markets appear as an equally used Bouree. Given Iha! bean seed can easily be selected out trom the 
prcvious harvest because it is self-pollinated, it is surprising how many furmers gel bean seed off-farm 
every season or every other season (about 30% across the sites) and how much they gel off-farm (at 
least 70% of stocks). Thus, most farmers gel more Ihan halftheir bean seed off farm on a regular basis. 
7. For bolh maize and beans, the Kenyan data contradict what is ofien taken as a lruism when describing 
farmer seed systems in Amea: that ¡s, that 'normal' filrmers use about 80% oftheir seed !Tom their own 
stocks, and that accessing off· farm is 'abnormal.' This Kenyan study shows that small farmers routinely 
rely on local markets for a significant portion oftheir seed. 
8. Farmers overwhelmingly expressed dissatisfaction with Iheir maize-procurement strategy, with Ihe 
notable exception ofBaringo where the 'progressive' sample accesses seed trom stockists. The large 
majority cannot afford certified seed (and find tbe prices exorbitant), and complain about the local 
market: Ihe right varieties not available, seed quality poor, merchants cheating on quantity, and 
distances. This widespread dissatisfaction seems relatively serious for a crop that forms Ihe core of 
theÍr agriculture. 
9. For bean-seed acquisition, farmer sentiment is also strong and clear across sites. The large majority find 
themselves heavily tíed to the local market, spendíng money without being sure ofthe quality they are 
receiving. Because beans are self-pollinated, farmers generally regard bean seed as something they 
should not have lo buy-using the money for school, medicine, and food instead. Overall, what does 
the 'average' farmer want in terms ofbean seed: self-sufficiency. She wants to save seed money, lo save 
tranSPOrt getting seed, and she wants Ihe seed on tíme-all ímplying that home-saved seed ís the way to 
go in these drought-prone areas. 
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10. Have seed trends improved for maize and beans over the last decade? Apparentlynot;just the 
opposite. Prices have gone up, exchange networks have become weaker, and deteriorating soíl fertility 
and fragmentation have meant smaller harvests. The few positive developments-some new varieties, 
the emergency of seed aid, the packaging ofvarieties in smaller packe!~o little 10 counteract srrong 
negative forces. 
11. There is no concrete evídence that seed aid, per se, is strengthening farmers' systems. Those who have 
received it once are no! necessarily less Iikely to receive it again. Amounts given were not significan! in 
the context offurmers' overal1 seed-procurement stra!egies. Furthennore, the main crop gi ven, hybrid 
maize, does no! ensure tha! farmers in these areas will become less dependent on outside BOUTees, as 
hybrids tend to perform well only in better conditions and have a huilt-in deterioration factor. 
Considering that it treats but a symptom, and perhaps not in the most effective way, seed aid (seed-
and-tools), as currently delivered, seems to he a rather costly intervention. 
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Section 5 
CHARACTERIZING SEED-SYSTEM CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES: 
THE KENYA CASE 
The 'externa!' analysis ofthe fanners' seed situation in Kenya (section 4) raises a nurnberoffundamental 
questions about the type ofproblern seed aid is and was supposed to alleviate. Seed-and-tools programs, 
that is, tite delivering of quantities of seed and basic tools on a one-tirne basis (tite kind ofintervention tita! 
is beingpractieed in Kenya), are designed to help funners outofternporary and well-defined acute stress. 
Seed-and-tools are given in a eontext where a series of assumptions are rnade, whether these are 
cousciously articulated ornot: 
- that farrning systerns have suffered an acute jolt and farrners have lost vital seed 
- that a di serete ínjection of seed will boost farrners' means to plant tite seed given, with labor, 
inputs, and the security adequate forplanting and harvesting 
- that the one-time provision of seed will help farrners re-establish an independent means of 
producing and accessing their own seed 
- that seed will be sufficientIy appropriate to fit in (adapt) and maybe even strengthen furrners' 
agricultural syslems (help them to evolve in positive ways). 
The early rationale for giving seed aid, rather than only food aid, was specifically lo help farrners regain 
their means ofproduetion and lo set them off in independent ways. However, what is happening in Kenya 
is that these oue-time 'push to self-sufficiency interventions' are beingrepeated and repeated. Has the 
problem or constraint been adequately diagnosed? Have the appropriate support activities been well 
defined? Have the support activities been designed lo link lO the specific problems or constraints al hand? 
The problem: Characterizing the constraints in Kenyan farmer seed systems-the 
broadview 
\Vhcn this studywas initialed, 'the problem' was presented as an acute one: Kenyan farmers suffered 
drought in the season prior to 1997 and needed critical seed lo sow the next time rains fell. The solution 
was given as seed, and the studywas to evaluale the effectiveness ofthe seed-delivery program; tita! is, the 
internal process and products: were the right varieties given, were they given on time, were they given in an 
equitable manner (see TOR, Annex 1). The goal was to rnake seed-and-Iools interventions more effective, 
more on the mark. 
However, as the work unfolded, using both government documents and perspectives (top-down 
overviews) and dmwing on valuable farrner-based data and insights (bottom up), it became clear that the 
drought situation was nol a one-offaffair. It was no! a discrete, acute disaster situation. For sorne Kenyan 
farmers, the last decade has been one in which they have suffered droughts on a repeated basis. Between 
distinct and severe dry periods, their farming systems have operated welL However, with sharp drops in 
rainfall, like that in 1991-92 and in 1996, they have required help from the out~ide-to get back to where 
they were. These farrners have been experíencing repeated acute stress. There are probably a range of 
reasons why these repeated acute (well-defined and delíneated) stresses are occurring, sorne ofwhich are 
meteorologicaL (Whetherthere has been a significant decline inrainfull on a longer-tenn basis in Kenya is 
debatable, wíth a discussion ofpossíbJe climate change being oulside the scope ofthis report.) 
For many Kenyan farrners within the sample, however, the seed stresses they described are neither acute 
nor repeated acute-they are there on a continual basis. Small p10ts (and harvests), unreliable minfall, lack 
of adapted varieties, poorly adapted crops (Iike maize in many areas), distant markets, scarcíty of cash lo 
purchase seed-alJ hinder theír being able to produce andlor access sufficient quanlities of seed each 
season. Whíle seed-and-tools treat their problems as acute, indeed theír stress situation is a chronic one. 
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A first artempt to conceptualize these different situations appears below (table 39). The first two columns 
ofthe table are faírly self-evident, and distinguish acute from repeated acute and from chronic di stress 
sítuations, usíng agroecologícal stresses lo differentiale among the three types. Severe drought once ís 
dífferent from severe drought every 10 years (repeated acute) and is different again frorn farming in an 
extremely dry area on a constant basis (chronic). The second two columns start to indicate, by building a 
theoretical framework, Ibat chronic, acute, and repeated acule situations affecting seed systems may be 
spurred byevents other Ihan agroecologícal ones. Disasters andlor constraints can be economicaUyor • 
politically induced, and a small number ofvariables that constrain seed systemsmay be direclly seed ami! 
or variety related. 
Table 39: Seed-stress situations: a general overview 
SEED-SYSTEM AGROECOLOGICAL ECONOMICIPOLITICAL SEED PROBLEM PER SE 
STRESS STRESS 
Chronic gradual dryness poverty-lirnited acces. to poor-quality seed produced ini 
semi-arid resources regionlfew adapted varieties ! 
! 
available 
[repeated acute I repealed droughts 
, 
i 
Acure One-off: civil disruptionlharvest loss 
drought, flood one season 
Using Ibis framework as a basis, we have started to plol Ibe infonnation ernerging from Ihis Kenyan case 
study. Table 40 suggests Ibal Ihe agroecological slresses are, perhaps, but one part oflbe full constraining 
picture. In Ibis first attempt to grasp the whole, economic and political constraints certainly leap forward as 
a major farmer-articulated problem. Further, the table suggests that focusing on seed and variety issues,per 
se, can be very inelfuctive in dealing with the real bottlenecks in many seed-system situations. Similarly, 
solving ¡he physical seed issue may not help seed systems lo function more effectively for any length of 
time. Much depends on what the problem(s) is.7 
In building from this initial framework, we start lO address two central issues for seed-system support 
interventions. The first directly addresses Ibe seed and variety issue: which crops/varieties, when? The 
second asks, more broadly, what might be Ibe appropriate range ofinterventions needed to bolster Kenyan 
fanners' seed systems? 
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Table 40: Seed-system stres_Indlcators dramng from farmers' Inslghts 
I SEED-SYSTEM AGROECOLOGICAL ECONQMICIPOLITICAL SEED PROBLEMI 
STRESS PERSE 
Chromc Gradual droughtldryness Poverty--access Region produces 
poor-quality seedl 
Makuem: UnreHable Embu: Friees have sky-rocketed in the fewadapted 
rainfall and pests I.ad lo Iasl' 10 yeafs; thal is why he uses home- varieties 
poor harvests saved seed, even though il doesn '1 
yieldmuch Adspted vanelÍes 
nol avaHable al 
Machakos: Not enough money lo buy markel (seed from 
adequale seed; land left unused; loo higher potential 
Hltle harvesl, nol enough rnoney regions) 
versus Market seed is of 
peor quality 
Embu: Befare she used lO save seed. 
from her land; now due lo Markets locoted 
fragmentation, land 3nd production is too far (10-20 km 
small, so she has lO buy from market 
every season. But .he can: "The markel Serious .torage 
doesn'! raH me." los,es (weevils) 
Eeoncmic and seed problems: I 
Doesn'l harvesl enough lo reed family; 
i 
eats seed; omy poor-quality seed al 
market 
, 
[Repe.ted acute 1 Repeated droughts Access/drought: Stockist or ,eed 
company doesn't 
Embu: she buys seeds when there is always have good-: 
drought-bUI al tbal time seeds quite qualíty seeds I 
expensive, so she huys less than she 
needs 
! 
Makuem: Rains fail; bul even when 
rains come, no! enough money lo huy 
: seed 
Acule One-time: drougbl, Polítical crisis, disruption 
flond 
Machakos: fanner received 
seed .id once in 1997 ! 
droughl; was aMe lo I 
1 preserve seed for hervest; has enough for full p1anting : ---._--.~ 
52 
Llnklng seed stress type to rigbt crops/varletles during crisis 
Right crops in an emergency 
What exactly docs 'right' crops mean? Are the priority crops for normal periods also necessarily the key 
crops 10 be given during an emergency situatíon, which, by definition, is characterized by sorne kind of 
stress? 
At a mínimum, insíghts garnered trom Kenyan farmers suggest that three categories of faclors need lo be 
addressed when choosing crops and varielies for emergency interventions. Crops/varieties should be: 
• adapted to furmers' bio-physical environment 
• adapted lo farmers' preferences 
• adapted to farmers' management conditions. 
Maybe a fourth would also be appropriate also-cropslvarieties should be: 
• those that facilitate risk-aversion. 
Would hybrid maize, the core of government-sponsored aid (with some open-pollinated varieties and 
composites) hold up well when compared against such categories? 
Certainly one criterion that is almost universally met in the GOK seed-aid strategy is adaptation to farmers' 
preferences. Farmers like these highlyvalued varieties (and the certified-seedcomponent)-even when they 
don't sow them-as hybrids have a high exchange value. In terms ofbio-physical adaptation, hybrids are 
clearly not adapted to the poorest of farming conditions. Farmers' comments, already cited, highlight this. 
One example follows: 
Embu: "The maize varieties trom seed relief and trom the stockist are les8 adapted to the 
environmentthan the local variety." [No. 20J 
Equally evident is that the hybrids are al80 not adapted to many ofthe farmers' management conditions. A 
good number said they need fertílizer with the aid, as they simply cannot buy it themselves. Another 
cornment: 
Machakos: "Seed reliefshould be complemented with fertilizers so that tbe seed given as aid ¡sn't 
wasted by some ponr farmers who can't afford fertilizers to get a good yield. " [No. 55] 
Some farmers even expressed the need to learn how to eultivate the varieties given as aid: 
Embu: "Seed aid should be accompanied byteehnical advice on spacing, fertilizers, and other 
practices. There are instructions on tbe package, but they are in English." [No. 1] 
Summing up the assessment ofhybrid maize against a 'right crop' emergency choice: most farmers 
interviewed, in four different sites, did not routinely access hybrid maize seed &om stockists, díd not have 
the management expertise, and rnay no! even have had the appropriate bio-physical environment to nurture 
the 'aid' varieties. Suboptimal environments and limited knowledge do not tallyup 10 promotingrisk-
aversion during a stress periodo Further, the in-built deterioration factor for hybrids does not necessarily 
promote self-reliance in the 10nger-tcrm for those farmers who cannot afforo 10 renew their stocks on an 
annual basis. 
The Kenya findings on the urgent need to define aid that is sensitive to fimners' full planting conditions are 
not necessarily unique. Simply put, the overriding bias for hybrids-bred through years and regions tbr 
more fuvorable environments-makes the situation somewhat extreme in iguoring basic emergency 
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principIes. A recent FAO-sponsored workshop on Restoring Farmers' Seed Systems in Disaster Situations 
(FAO 1999) also reiterated the need fOf highly tailored types of seed aid. There, the term adopted was 
"variety-sensitive aid," encompassing the idea ofboth adapted and farmer-acceptable varieties. It was 
further suggested !ha! the range ofvarieties on offer should be diverse enough 10 meet fanners' critical 
needs (e.g., varieties for different foods, differentplanting periods) (Sperling 1999). 
Tailoring crops/varieties to tJ:pe of crisis 
Logically, additional criteria could be tailored to the notion of'right crop or variety,' depending on the 
stress. To encolll1lge reflection, several examples are given below, which link directly to the 'seed-stress 
framework' introduced aboye. 
• Ifthe stress has been acute and farmers are at a significant 1088 forplanting material and food, 
crops that are quicker maturing would seem to be the more logical. This situation can be 
iIlustrated in an example!Tom the 1994 Rwanda war/genocide. Farmers lost almost half oftheir 
beans in the field when the conflict escalated al harvest lime 1994. As irnmediale aid, they strongly 
preferred the bush type ofbean thal matures in about three months, rather than the much higher-
yielding climbing-bean type, which may take fourto five months. Both bush and climbing beans 
are priority crops for Rwandan farmers in normal times (and are seen as highly complementary in 
the same farming syslem), bul bush beans were deemed more crucial in the first stages of 
emergency-recovery. So sequenclng of crops is key if one assumes lbat the aeute crisis will end, 
with more normal planting oonditions being re-established. 
• Ifthe stress has been more cbronlc (or even 'repeated acute'), CTOpS that perform beíter 
during tbe specific stress conditions might be more appropriate. Drought in Kenya seems lo be 
occurring more frequently and seems to be more widespread: seed distributions for every season 
since 1992 show public awareness ofthis trend. The choice of seed-aid crops in NGO, but not 
govemment, distributions are starting lo reflectpractícal knowledge ofthis trend. Crops líke 
sorghum and green gram mayprove more tolerant to droughl stress than hybrid maize in select 
locales. 
• Ifthe stress la cbronic, then more capaclty-building crup choiees may be appropriate. By Ihis, 
we suggest Ihal sorne erops can be more easily managed by farmers and more casily sustained 
over seasons. For instance, farmers who are chronically short oftheir own home-saved seed and 
are chronically sort of eash lo top-off stocks with market purehases mighl be better offwith 
open-pollinated or vegetativelypropagated erops. The latlcr can be replanted without external 
resources and would be preferable lo fertilizer-responsivel-demanding hybrid maíze or 
commercial vegetable seed Ihat requires special care or inputs. Chronie stress also demands a 
more holístic seed-system approach, beyond issues of seed and variely (see "linking types of 
non-seed-aid interventions," below). 
Other examples can be developed, and a more comprehensive framework is needed for linking type of 
stress with the appropriate nolion ofthe 'righ! erop.' Simplyput, the righ! crop for an emergency situation 
may not the mosl appropriate fOT longer-Ierm recovery. The 'right crop/variety' should be chosen in relation 
lo the type of stress encountereu. As base enteria, all 'nghl crops' have lo be adapted (bio-physícally, 
soeially, and in terms of management practíces) and have to be aeceptable 10 farmers. Then variables such 
as crop maturily, and ability lo push fanners on the palh lo self-sustainability, mighl be faetored in as key 
elements. 
Linking type of seed stress to non-seed-aid interventions to support seed systems 
A range of current interventions in seed-system support in East Amca aim lo strengthen farmer seed 
systems in the longer termo Their aims inc1ude delívering more localIyadapted varieties, ensuring that even 
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the poorest fanners can get new material s, improving the quality offarmer seed, and even helping fanners 
earn mone: !Tom seed production operations. Annex 7 (prepared by S. David) summarizes over a dozen of 
these programs. They iIIustrate that a body ofwork is emerging to help address sorne ofthe more chronic 
constraints to seed-system health. 
However, a good deal ofthe challenge to strengthening the systems by which farmers access seed lies in a 
more refined diagnosis ofwhere the constraints and opportunities lie. Analysis ofseed systems-farmer, 
formal, and those that aim to integrate the two-is a telatively new field. Prior to a decade ago, development 
work focused almost exclusively on supporting the institutionalized or formal seed sector, as this was the 
supposed vehicle through which farmers would receive modern varieties emerging !Tom the formal research 
system. In Africa, at least, seed-system experts now estimate that such institutional channels may supply 
farmers with, at most, 5% oftheir seed, the obvious exception being maize in areas where hybrids have 
attained wide use, such as the Southern African Region and the higher-potential areas ofKenya and other 
Eastern African countries (personal cornmunication, see the companion volume to this report). 
This section ends by making the first steps to understanding what the full components of a seed system 
might be and how they need to be linked. The companion volume starts to layout a methodology for 
diagnosing the strengths and weaknesses ofthe various seed-system components. More-targeted diagnosis 
should directly lead to more-targeted interventions, with longer-Iastingpositive impacts. 
Moving toward characterizing stresses in seed systems: A more refined view 
A seed specialist, someone who focuses on producing and distributing seed as a physical input, might feel 
comfortable with viewing the building blocks of a 'seed system' as four basic units: testing the material, 
multiplying it to ensure availability, distributing it to ensure access, and then possible storage. At each of 
these stages, both varietal issues (which genetic material s?) as well as seed issues (quality, quantity) are 
considered. These four basic blocks appear in a linear fashion in figure 1, although, of course, the end 
feeds into the beginning and so the cycle re-starts. 
Figure 1: Seed-system components 
Seed and variety .... Seed and variety .... 
testing multiplication 
Seed and variety .... 
distribution 
Technical content 
Social context and dynamics 
lnstitutional context 
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Seed and 
variety s torage 
A person wilh more of a seed-systems perspective would add a series of filtering lenses, so as to make 
these blocks more realistic or closer to what actually happens. First, each of Ihe blocks obviously has 
technical content: e.g., what level of genetic purity; how much multiplied? Equally, each block has a 
strong social content or set of social dynamics: which varieties are preferred by different farmcrs; how 
will the multiplication be organized so people will work together; how can the channels be made user-
ftiendly so Ihat all have access? In addition to Ihe technical analysis and Ihe analysis of social 
dynamics, one might even add a lens of "institutional analysis," since Ihe kind oftechnical and social 
strategies are intimately tied to Ihe institutions (whether formal or local) through which one works 
(figure 1). 
The situalion is complicated further by the increasing evidence that farmers use a variety of seed 
systems for differenl crops and for different purposes. For inSlanee, Ihe same farmer might get cassava 
cuttings from her neighbor in exehange for labor, buy her beans from one of Ihe local open markets, and 
purchase her maize from a stockist in a specialized govemment slore. And from time to time, these 
different systems intersect; for example, maize bought from Ihe stockist is exchanged wilh the neigbbor 
and sown for several seasons, Ihus affecting its quality. Figure 2 (prepared for differenl purposes by 
Almekinders and DeBoef (2000) slarts to indicate the complex relationships between farmer and formal 
syslems: sometimes linking, sometimes no!. 
The point in selting up these conceptual diagrams is because they help serve as a grounded base for 
diagnosing Ihe strengths and weaknesses of different seed-system components that might need 
strengthening in an emergency situation and beyond. Al! might be well with the testing and 
multiplication blocks, but the main boltlenecks in a crisis period might have to do with tbe distribution 
channels. Seed i5 available in theory, but farmers may be afraid to go to public plaees (because of war) 
or may just not have the means to buy from the market (they have lost assets during Ihe crisis), Neither 
of these problems is mosl effectiveJy soJved by giving seed. In the first inslance, the seed intervention 
might focus on ensuring 5ecurity; in the other, vouchers or credit might be considered. 
Figure 2: The local system of farmers' seed supply and the formal system-two paraUet functioning 
systems with relatively Ilttle interaction (Almekinders and DeBoef 2000) 
Genebanks 
Producers 
(high potential areas) 
" .,.SEED 
~ a_., 
.... , ---, 
" Marl<et Planting 
cullivation 
harvest 
Storage 
exchange 
Breeders ., ,seed production 
.................... _----""". 
FORMAL SYSTEM 
Quality central 
The issue of seed-system diagnosis, developing indicators of seed-system health, and Iinking specific 
problems with specific solutions forms the core intere"t oflhe complemenlary volume to Ihis reporl, 
Such a volume was not anticipated al the beginning ofthe Kenyan seed study, mainly because the TOR 
inadequately anticipated the fundamental Kenyan seed-system needs. 
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Discussion: Characterizing seed-system constraints and opportunities-the Kenya case 
In a sen se, the end ofthis report is really lhe beginning. The key to improving the series of crisís seed 
situations in Kenya líes in more accurately diagnosing lhe underlying problem in seed-system functioning. 
Continuing to deliver seed-and-tools may be analogous to putting a band-aid on a gushing wound. 
lt i8 clear that many fanners have chronic problems producing and accessing seed. It also holds true that 
lhose with 'just' acule seed stress es are probably nót being best served by sorne ofthe current seed-aid 
deliverypractices. (Practices may be technically ilI-infonned, and theyare certainly crearing 
counterproductive dependencies.) The refonn of seed-system support in Kenya might bes! be articulated 
by a series of simple, yet challenging, steps that fonn the core of future action: 
1. Accurately diagnose the seed-system problem (or cluster of problems for different populations). 
2. Define precise and transparent goals of seed-aidlseed-system capacity building. 
3. Buíld in flexibility to be able to act in site-specific manner. 
4. Always Ihink longer-tenn. Prom the discrete notion ofseed aid, we need lo move to a focus on howto 
support ¡he current system and how to build increased capacity to help seed systems function by 
lhemselves. 
Summary: Key points 
l. The external perspective on seed aid has documented the general vulnerabilíty of fanners' seed systems 
and overall agricultural systems. 
2. Por sorne Kenyan farrners, including lhose in the semi-arid areas studied in this report, lhe last decade 
has been one in which lhey have suffered droughts on a repeated basís. Between distinct and severe dry 
periods, their fanning systems have operated well. However, with sharp drops in rainfall, líke lhat in 
1991-~92 and 1996, they have required help from the outside to get back to where they were. These 
fanners have beell experiencing repeated acute stress. 
3. For many Kenyan fanners within the sample, lhe seed slTesses they describe are neither acute nor 
repeated acute-they are experienced on a continua] basis. Small plots (and harvests), unreliable rainfall, 
lack of adapted varieties, poorly adapted crops (like maize in many areas), distant markets, scarcity of 
cash to purchase seed all hinder lhe ability of fanners lo produce andlor access sufficient quantities of 
seed each season. While seed-and-tools treat their problems as acule, indeed their stress situation is a 
chronic one. 
4. This section seIs out a framework for examining acute, repeated acute, and chronic stresses, cross-
cutting these seed-system disaster types with roo! causes: agroecological, political/economic, and seed-
system issues lhernselves. 
5. In plotting material from the Kenyan case relating to seed-system functioning, economic and polítical 
constraints Icap forward as a major fanner-articulated constraint. Furthennore, the analysis shows that 
focusing on seed and variety issues, per se, can be ineffectíve for dealing with the real bottlenecks in 
rnany seed-system situations. 
6. The issue of'right seedlcrop' is examined in the contexl of emergency versus non-emergency 
situations. At a mínimum, crops/varieties for emergency interventions need to be: 
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• adapted to fimners' bio-physical environment 
• adapted to farmer's preferences 
• adapted 10 farmers management conditions 
• those Ihat facilitate risk aversion. 
'Right variety/crop' ís also examined by differentiating acute, repeated acute, and chronic seed-system 
slresses. 
7. Hybrid maize is a poor choice in Ihe context of acute, repeated acute, and chronic stress situations. 
Most farmers do not roulinely access hybrid maize seed from Ihe stockist, do nol have Ihe management 
expertise, and maynot even have the appropriate bio-physical environment in which nurture Ihe 'aid' 
varieties. Suboptimal environments and limiled knowledge do nottally up lo promoting risk-aversion 
during a stress periodo Further, the built-in deterioration factor for hybrids does not necessarily promo!e 
self-relianee in Ihe longer-term for Ihose farmers who cannol afford lo renew their stocks on an annual 
basis. Simply put, Ihe overriding bias on hybrids-which have boen developed mostly for more favored 
environments, allhough recently hybrids have been developed for short-season environmenls-makes 
the situation somewhat an extreme case ofignoring basic emergency principIes. 
8. A range of seed-system support interventions in East Africa is reviewed. These interventions go beyond 
seed-and-tools and have vanous airns including delivery of more locally adapted vaneties, ensuring Ihat 
even the poorest farmers can gel new materials, improving the quality of farmer seed, and even helping 
farmers earo money from seed-production operatíons. The review iIlustrates that a body ofwork is 
emerging lo help address sorne oflhe more chronic constraints lo seed-systern health. 
9. A paramount challenge to strengthening the systems by which farmers access seed rests in a more 
refined diagnosis ofwhere the constraints and opportunities lie. Analysis of seed systems-whethera 
!armer system, Ihe formal sector, or a system Ihat aims to integrate the two-is a relatively new fie\d. 
Prior to a decade ago, development work focused almost exclusively on supporting the institutionalized 
or formal seed sector. In Africa, seed-system experts estimate that such institutional channels rnay 
supply farmers wílh, at most, 5% oflheir seed, Ihe obvious exceptíon being maize in areas where 
hybrids are well adapted and have attained wide use. 
lO. The section ends by starting to sketch the full components ofa seed system and Iheir interlínking 
relationships. (The companion volume jays out a more complete methodology for diagnosing such 
strengths and weaknesses.) Continuing to deliver seerl-and-tools may be analogous to putting a band-
aid on a gushing wound. However, more targeted diagnosis lays Ihe foundations for more targeted 
interventions-interventions Ihat have longer lasting positíve impacts. 
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A,,1IeX 1 
Project Purpose 
A CASE STUDY OF LESSONS LEARNED 
IN EMERGENCY SEEIJ..AID IN KENYA 
A Proposalto USAID 
Submitted by Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical (CIAT) 
in conjunction with Mississippi State University (MSU) 
This project aims to improve the design and implementation offuture seed relief efIorts in Eastern and 
Central Africa by províding an analysis of a case study in Kenya. 
Development Rationale 
Donor expenditures on emergency reliefin Eastern and Central Africa bave been nsing steadíly, with a 
corresponding depressíon of funding to development efIorts. Immediate needs forfood aid in response to 
droughts, other natural emergencies and civil insurgencies represent a large part oftbis increase. Provision 
of'crop seed to farmers in order to aid a recovery of production is often a componen! of sucb programs; 
according lo sorne, the United Stales Agency for International Development (USAID) alone spends $20 
mi Ilion annually on emergency seed programs. While the response is appropriale, it is not sustainable, does 
not contribute lo long-terrn development efIorts and bas in sorne cases harrned the recovery oflong-terrn 
production tbrough tbe introduction ofpoorly adapted varieties. 
Relief elforts can be improved by identiJYing appropriate roles for, and coordinating the elforts of donors, 
non-govemmental organizations (NGOs), the private sector, !he public sector (national research and 
extension systems), and inlernational agricultural rcsearcb centers (lARCs). EfIorts that also bave Ihe efIect 
of strengthening local andlor regional seed systems can be expected to have longer-term benefits. Lack of 
knowledge on how local seed systems function (how, where and when farrners of difIerent categories 
obtain seed of dilferent crops) often limits the diffusion and adoption ofnew varieties even in favorable 
times; weak seed systems make tbe entire system less rcsilient in times ofstress. 
A recent review of seed aid activities concluded tbat few in-depth analyses had becn camed out following 
the end of an emergency (Overseas Development Institute, 1996). One well-analyzed case concemed the 
Seeds ofHope (SOH) project (Sperling, 1996). This project will contribute to addressing tbis lack of 
information byproviding a detailed analysis of one case study, related to tbe provision of seed aid to Kenya 
during and immediately after a serious drougbt in the period 1995-1997. This proposed Kenyan case study 
would complement tbe SOH case by focussing on a country witb a better-developed infrastructure for seed 
production and marketing, inc\uding an active prívate sector that was missing from Rwanda. 
Objectives 
The five main objectíves may be summarized as follows: 
1. Draw overalllessons on organizational efIectiveness ofthe seed aid acquisition and distribution 
process: donors' point ofview 
2. Assess the general appropriateness of the seed aid package 
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3. Draw overall lessons on Ihe effectiveness/equity of Ihe local distribution process: fanners' point of view 
4. Synthesize fanner assessments on Ihe type ofseed aid delivered 
5. Assess the effectiveness ofthe seed aid itselfin supportingand stabiHzing the farming system 
Activities and Information needs 
A history oflhe seed situation in Kenya will be examined for Ihe past JO years, using secondary infonnation 
from public and private institutions, although the main focus will be on the emergency rcHef of 1996/97. It 
wíll be important, in view oflhe possible effects oftiming and type offood aid upon the use and 
appropriateness ofthe seed aid, lo make sorne assessments oflhe overall aid package delívered in Kenya: 
foed aid and lools, as well as the seed of each crop (principally sorghum and maizc). 
The whole seed aid process would be more cost-effective over the long-term if dístributed seed were used 
nol simply as a stop gap measure, but made a contributíon over Ihe long-term. Farmers themselves are wel1 
placed lo eomment on whelher Ihere were dístínct positive or negative effecls ofthe seed aid on farming 
community equity. While institutional and national-Ievel experiences and perspectives will be importanl, 
local recommendations may need lo be tailored accordingly. 
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Uganda Seed Workshop Program, June 2000 
"TARGETED SEED AID AND SEED SYSTEM INTERVENTIONS: 
STRENGTHENING SMALL FARMER SEED SYSTEMS IN EAST A.1\ID CEI'o'TRAL 
AFRICA" 
Workshop funded by USAID grant #LAG-4111-00-3042-00 
Co-hosted by: 
International Center for Tropical Agriculture 
Catholic ReliefServices 
Overseas Development Institute 
National Agriculture Research Organization, Uganda 
June21-24,2000 
Kampala, Uganda 
Day 1: June 21, Wednesday 
Session I: INTRODUCTION 
8:00- 8:30 Welcome remarks: NARO, ClAT, CRS 
8:30- 9:00 Objectives ofworkshop: Louise Sperling and Tom Remington 
9:00- 9:30 Introductíon ofparticipants 
9:30-\0:00 Coffeeffea 
Session 11: THINKlNG ABOUT FARMERS' SEED SYSTEMS: 
WHAT ARE THEIR COMPONENTS? 
(this includes al! seed systems farmers' use: formal, intermediate, less formal) 
10:00-11:30 
a) Conceptual components of seed svstems 
11:30-13:00 
Shawn McGuire (Wageningen AgriculturallJniversity): 
Sorne conceptual cornponents of seed systems 
Eva Weltzien (International Conter for Research in !he Semi-Arid Tropics) 
Seed syslerns and their po/ential for innova/ion: genetic diversity. institutions and their 
linkages 
GROUP DISCUSSION 
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b) Diagnosing the 'health' offarmer seed systems 
who, what, how to develop indicators of'health'l stress 
Kate Longley (Overseas Development Institute) 
The health offarmer seed systems 
GROUP DISCUSSION 
13 :00· 14:00 Lunch 
14:00-16:00 
e} Diagnosizing of different tvpe ofDisasters/ stresses 
d) Diagnosizing different tvpes ofSeed Svstem constraints: acute, chronic, repeated acule---
Tom Remington (Catholic ReliefServices) 
Guidelines for the assessment ofthe impact of disaster on smallholder 
agricultural systems 
GROUP DISCUSSION 
16:00-16:30 CoffeelTea 
16: 30-17 :30 Synthesis ofthe day: Lessons, issues lo discuss further, Implícations for guidelines 
Day 2: June 22, Thursday 
8:30-11 :00 
Session III: SEED SYSTEM INTERVENTIONS DURING EMERGENCY IREHAB 
PERIODS; REFLECTIONS ON LESSONS LEARl\fED FOR SEED SYSTEMS IN 
ACUTE STRESS (OR REPEATED ACUTE STRESS) 
Louise Sperling (International Cenler for Tropical Agriculture) 
A case study of lessons learned in emergency seed aid in Kenya 
Jon Magnar Haugen (Norwegian Agricultural University) 
Seed systems of small farmers in Honduras--their relevance for interventions 
Sigrid de Brabantare (Norwegian Agricultural University) 
Study on decision-making processes in seed supply and seed distribution 
interventions in emergency situations: the case ofHonduras. 
Anton Bua and G. AcoJa (NARO- Uganda) 
Multiplication and distribution strategies for improved cassava varieties in 
Uganda 
Christoph Langenkamp (ICRC-Sornalia) 
Emergency seed interventions in Somalia; a reflection on the current si/uation 
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, 
11 :(J()..12:30 Synthesis session III: lessons, issues lo discuss further, Implications for guidelines 
12:30-J3:30 Lunch 
13:30-J4:30 
Session IV: SEED SYSTEM INTERVENTlON FOR CHRONICALLY STRESSED SYSTEMS: 
(STRENGTHENING SYSTEMS): RELFECTlONS ON LESSONS LEARNED-
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ACTION 
Soniia David (CIAT-Africa) 
Seed systems interven/ians in eastern Africa Jar chronically-stressed situatíons 
(with emphasís on bean-related ac/ivi/tes) 
14:30-15:30 Synthesis sessions: lessons learned, issues to discuss further, implications for guidelines 
15:30-16:00 CoffeeITea 
16:00-17:30 
Session V: LINKING EMERGENCY WITH REHAB Allí']) SUPPORT TO CHRONIC 
STRESS SITUATlONS 
Diress Mengistu : Norwegian People's Aid: South Sudan Program 
Linkíng Emergency wi/h Rehabiliation and Suppar/ lo Chronic Stress Situatian 
GROUP DISCUSSION: SYNTHESIS SESSI0N 
Day 3: June 23, Fríday 
8:30-\1:30 
Session VI: WORKING GROUPS I 
a) 
b) 
e) 
Diagnosizing seed system constraints 
components 
type possible of constraint 
Indicator development 
Guidelines lo encourage the link between emergency lo rehab-and 
encouraging the development of sustainable sytcms 
Diagnosing different types of'disaster' witbin Farming System Perspective 
11:30-13:00 WORKING GROUP Report back 
13:00-14:00 Lunch 
14:00- 16:00 WORKING GROUPS Il-- refining same themes (maywant lo change composition of 
groups 
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----- ---_._-
16:00-17:30 WORKING GROUP Report back 
FINAL 'Substance' PRODUCT BY END OF DAY 
Day 4: June 24, Saturday 
8:30-12:30 NEXT STEPS (includíngcollaboration) 
- practical actíon 
- further development of conceptual lools 
- ref1nemenl of guídelines 
- joínt grant proposals? 
- trainíng needs 
12:30-13:00 Closure ofworkshop 
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Annex V 
UGANDA SEED WORKSHOP 
List oC Participants 
Almekinders Conny 
Agro-ecologist 
Technology & Agrarian Development 
Wageningen Utúversity 
Nieuwe Kanaalll 
6709 PA Wageníngen 
The NetherIands 
Emai1: c_almekinders@zonnet.ne 
Tel: +31-317427447 
Fax: +31-317484759 
BuaAnton 
Socio-Economist 
NARO 
Namulonge Research lnstitute 
P.O. Box 7084 
Kampala, Uganda 
Email: NAARl@NARO.BUSHNETNET 
Tel: +256-(0)77461950/433224 
Brockman Frank 
Agronomist / 
Regional Technical Advisor 
CRS 
P.O. Box CY 1111, Causeway 
Harare, Zimbabwe 
Emaíl: brockman@ícon.co.zw 
Tel: +263-4-704662/ 723195 
Fax: +263-4-705339 
David Soniia 
Sociologist 
ClAT 
P.O. Box 6247 
Kampala, Uganda 
Email: S.DAVID@CGlARORG 
Tel: +25641-566282 
Fax: +256-41-567635 
Haugen Jon Magnar 
StudentAgric. Univ. ofNorway / 
Thesís: Cooperatíon with CIAT 
P.O. Box 484, 1432 AS Norway 
Email: jon.magnar.haugen@nca.no 
Tel: +47-64-943388 
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Kirkby Roger 
Agrononúst 
CIAT 
P.O. Box 6247 
Kampa1a, Uganda 
Email: ClAT-AFRICA@CGIARORG 
Te!: +256-41-567670 
Fax: +256-41-567635 
Langenkamp Christoph 
Rural Development TA 
European Cornmission Somalía UnÍ! 
P.O. Box 30475 
Nairobi, Kenya 
Email: From 1.8.200 
Christoph.LANGENKAMP@cec.eu.int 
Othetwise Iangenk@net2000ke.com 
Tel: +254-2-7144131718186/714146 
Fax: +254-2-724657 
Kate Longley 
Research Fellow 
Overseas Development Institute 
Portland House, Stag Place 
London SWIE 5DP 
Ernail: k.longley@odí.org.uk 
Tel: +44-20-7393-1600/1601/1667 
Fax: +44-20-7393-1699 
Matungulu Kande-M., 
Agricultural Tcchnical Advisor 
Emergency Response Team (ERT) 
Catholic RelíefServices 
P.O. Box 49675 
Nairobi, Kenya 
Email: Kmatungulu@crs-ert.or.ke 
Tel: +254-2442086/443804/443853 
Fax: +254-2-440310 
McGuire Shawn 
Student - Technology and Agrarian Dev, 
tu.-. Uní . 
.. ..¡¡,;;;amgen versity 
NieuweKanaalll, 
6709 PA Wageningen 
The Netherlands 
Ernail: Sbawn.Mcguire@Alg.TAO.WAU.NL 
Tel: +31-317482873 
Fax: +31-317-484759 
Mengistu Diress 
Agronomist 
Norwegian People's AID 
P.O. Box 39207 
Nairobi, Kenya 
Ernail: kmiIIer@npaid.or.ke 
TeI: +254-2-574063/4 
Moggalacob 
Agriculturist (Apiculturist) 
CRS 
Mutbitbi Road - Westlands 
P.O. Box 48932 
Nairobi, Kenya 
Tel: +254-2-74802213 
Fax: +254-2·750658 
Mugisa-Mutetikka Mary 
Agricultural Economist / 
Socio Economics Researcher 
NARO/NAARl 
P.O. Box 7084 
KampaIa, Uganda 
Email: NAARI@NARO.Bushnet.net 
TeI:+25~77-43l310 
MwebesaLawrence 
Agriculture, SO 2000 
P.O. Box 6987 
Kampala,Uganda 
Email: Sgugands@mail.stan:om.co.ug 
Opio Fina 
Plant Pathologist 
NAARI/NARO 
P.O. Box 7084 
Kampala, Uganda 
Email: naari@a&at.com 
Remington TOOl 
AgricuItural Tecbnical Advisor 
CRS / East Aftica 
P.O. Box49675 
Nairobi, Kenya 
EmaiI: tremington@crseam.org 
TeI:+254-2-741355 
Serunjogi K. Lastus 
Plant Breeder 
NAROISAARl 
Serere P.O. Soroti 
Uganda 
EmaiI: SaaridiJ@infoco.co.ug 
TeI: +256-45-61192 
Fax: +256-45-61444 
Sigrid de Barbentane 
Master Student at the Agricultural University of 
Norway 
Bronnerudv.47 
P.O. Box 1432 AS 
Norway 
Email: Sigrid.de.baroelltalle@care.no 
Sperling Louise 
Social Scientist, PROAlClAT 
Frankenstraat 26 
2582 SL TheHague 
TheNetherlands 
Email: L.Sperling@cgiar.org 
Tel: +31703559963 
Studer L. Raymond 
Nortbern Prograrnme Coordinator 
CRSUganda 
P.O. Box823 
Oulu, Uganda 
Email: crsug3@infocom.co.ug 
Te!: +256-077·221495 (officc) 
+256-0471·32404 (residencc) 
Eva Weltzien 
PlantBreeder, Sorghum 
ICRISAT 
BP. 320 Bamako, Mali 
Email: E.Weltzien@icrisatml.org 
Tel: +223 223375 
Fax: +223 228683 
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AN INVENTORY OF SEED SYSTEM SUl'PORT INTERVENTIONS IN EASTERN 
AFRICA 
Prepared by Soniia Daví4, Intematíonal Center for Tropical Agriculture (ClA1) 
1. Plant Breedlng 
Projeet: Participatory Plant Breeding with Women and Small Farmers In Afrlca and Latin 
America 
This project, initíated in 1996, explores metltods of collaboratíve plant breeding witlt filrmers al three mtes 
in Etltiopia, one in Tanzania, and one in Colombia. Its ratíonale is tita! botlt beans and cassava (tite crop 
foci) are key small-farmer crops and crucial for urban consumption and for delivering export revenue. Yet 
formal plant-breeding research to-date has had less impact than expected (newly released varieties are ofien 
unpopularamong farmers and processors, especiallywomen, because ofundesirable seed colorslsizes; 
culinary attributes, such as laste and cooking time; agronomic characteristícs, such as being poor1y 
competítive witlt weeds; and poorprocessing potential due lo starch quality and storage life). 
The project, which is a collaboration between ClAT and NARSs partners and is funded by DFID UK, has 
several common features al all sites. Multiple diagnostíc metltods are contrastedlcompared to get a refined 
view offilrmerpreferences; farmers are exposed to numerous fixed and segregating lines so as to 
encourage a diversity of cultivars to be tested and evaluated; variety screening is quickly decentralized to 
tite community leve) to allow for site-specific adaptatíon; and seed production and distribution is built into 
tite 'breeding' design to allow several varieties to be diffused at once and sustained in communities in tlteir 
local filrming systems. 
The Tanzanian site is distinctive in tltat it started work witlt filrmers using segregatíng lines (startíng witlt F J 
while the other siles focus on stabilized rnaterials. 
2. Seed dissemlnatlon 
Projee!: An investlgatlon oC alternative bean-seed marketing ehannels in Uganda 
In assistíng natíonal commodityprograrns in devísing cost-effective delivery systerns, collaborative 
research was conducted by ClAT in Uganda to test tite appropriateness ofbean-seed distribution through 
four unconventional channels: rural shops, a rural hea)tIt clinic, women's groups, and an NGO. The findings 
confirm the feasibility of distributing seed packets tltrough market and non-market channels and show that 
each delivery system has advantages and disadvantages tltat must be assessed by seed suppliers in a 
country-specific contexto The report offers guidelines for the distribution ofnew bean varieties by formal 
instítutions (David et al. 1997). 
72 
Project: Seed dissemination througb rural stoddsts in TallZllnia 
In 1996-97 the Tanzanian National Bean Program and CIAT implemented a pilot project to test the 
suitabilityofseUing seed ofmodem bean varieties through rural stockists. 
Project: Dlssemination of new hean varieties in Malawi 
From 1996-1998, the Malawi Bean improvement Program (BIP) organized theproduction and sale of 
small seed packs ofsix new bean varieties. Tbe packs were ofthree sizes: 100 g, 250 g, and 500 g. Tbe 
varieties were also promoted tbrough posters and radio announcements. Packs were sold at a price below 
cost-recoveTy. All merchants interviewed during a follow-up stody expressed interest in continuing with the 
sale of small packs and most said that tbey would be willing 10 pay for the smaU packs at the beginning of 
the season (phiri et al. 2000). 
Project: The appropriateness and effectiveness oC drama as an agricultural extenslon tool 
In 1996 the Ndere Dance Troupe, CIAT, and the Agroforestry Research Network of Africa (AFRENA) 
implemented a project to disseminate information on climbing beans and multipurpose agroforestry trees in 
Uganda through drama. Tecbnical messages on new bean varieties and agricultoral and social practices 
were effectively communicated to women fimners. Althougb the organizers had planned to seU seed ofthe 
bean varieties during the performances, this was never done (for unknown reasons). Tbus, this project 
provides an example of a rnissed opportunity for seed dissemination (Munro, 1998). 
Project: Approal:hes for dissemination of new bean varieties in urhan areas 
One ofthe main objectives ofthis project, initiated in 1999 by CIAT and the Uganda National Bean 
Program, was 10 test different strategies for the promotion and dissemination ofnew bean varieties in urban 
arcas. 
Community meetings were held in two communities in the capital city ofUganda (Kampala) to decide on 
sale outlets. Atthe start ofthe rnain season, 210 kg offive new bush-bean packed in 250 gpaekets with 
labels in locallanguages, were delívered 10 local authorities ín the two communities fur sale. Seed 
distributors were compensaled with 30% of sale eamings. Posters promoting the new varieties were also 
dístributed 10 sale outlets. Seed sellers were requested to keep records of sales and to limi! sales to 500 g 
oC each varietyper household. Two demonstrations per communitywere establíshed to introduce two new 
climbíng beans (Vunikingi and Umubano varieties), a new technology to mos! Kampala farmers. 
Farmers rejected seed sales through several channels thal haveproved eftective in rural settings (e.g., 
clínics, shops). Shops were rejected because of shopkeepers' tendency to mix in seed of dubious quality, 
the desire 10 ¡¡míl sales to community rnembers for purposes ofthe study, and the need 10 aecount for sale 
proceeds. Because cUnica were under-staffed and the study required record keeping, it was dífficull lo find 
clinic staffwilling to take the responsibiJity for selling the seed. Lack of space to store the seed in elínics 
was also problernatic. Seed was sold through the offices and hornes oflocal authorities, at local rneetings, 
and through door-to-door sales. Over a six-week period, 136 kg ofseed were sold to 165 fimners. Women 
buyers outnumbered men (121 compared to 44) in both communities. 
Major problems encountered with selIíng through local authorities included Iimited efforts 10 widely 
promote and popularize the varietÍes because of otber commítments, the frequent absence oflocal 
authorities, and the centralized nature of selling ftom hornes and offices, which lirniled farmers' aceess 10 
the seed. One conclusion ofthe stody is to avoid using localleaders lo dístribute seed. Because issues of 
rnistrustmay be more prevalent in urban areas, dístribution through other types of commercial channels 
may be more appropriate in towns. Tbese may ¡nelude agricultural supply shops, roadside kiosks, market 
vendors, and churches. 
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Projed: Pelum Assodatlon seed-security program 
The purpose ofthe program is to strengtben the capacity fOI" training in seed security, networking, and 
improving the capacity of small-scale fimners to maintain and develop quality and diverse seed and planting 
materials for fuod and livelihood security. The program implements training programs on seed se.--urity for 
community extensiun workers in Eastem and Southem Africa and is developing a manual for extension 
workers on seed security (Contact PELUM, Harare, Zimbabwe). 
4. Seed Enterprises 
Projed: Commerclal enterprises for producing cassava cuttings in Uganda 
See paperpresented al the complementary Uganda workshop. 
Projeet: Developing farmer seed enterprises (FSEs) 
Between 1994 and 1997, ClAT conducted a pilot study in Eastern and Central Uganda to develop 
modalities fOI" supporting specialized farmer seed producers. Besns were the target crop. Fanner seed 
enterprises are proposed as a sustainable approach for disseminating new crop vaneties, although the 
approach can also be used to produce good quality seed oflocal varieties. 
The pilot project supported four farmer groups in Mbale, Iganga, and Mukono districts. Fanners received 
training in seed productioD, business practices, bookkeeping, and group dynamics. A participatory 
approaeh was used in training and in all aspects of developing FSEs. To minimize the funners' risk-taking, 
stress ownership ofilie business, and avoid creating a dependency mentality, equipment and seed were 
provided on a cost-sharing basis between fanners and ClAT. 
FSEs multíplied two new bean vaneties: K132 and K131. Produetion and productivityby all three 
enterprises was disappointingly low: the Ikulwe Bean Farmers' Association produeed the most seed over 
seven seasons (2561 kg), followed by Budama Women's Group (535 kg produeedover four seasons) and 
Makhai Women's Group (478 kgprodueed over four seasons). Yields per unit area (689-866 kglha for 
K132 and 369--6 10 kglha forK131) andmultiplieationrates(a rangeof5-9 for K132 and 7-9 fur 
K131) were modest for sole cropping. Five fuctors account for the low yields ofseed growers: adverse 
climatic conditions (drought, hailstonns, hesvy tains), high disease and pest incidence, poor cultural 
practices (poor land preparation, late planting, wide spaeing), lack ofaccess lo resources such as ¡and and 
oxen, poor soils andIor low soH fertility. By 2000, two ofthe four groups were still involved in seed 
production and had developed local markets. 
The Ugandan case studies confirmed two important points. First, sman-seale African farmers can be 
organized and motivated to produce and seU good-quality bean aeed. Second, demand exists among 
smallholders fur good-quality seed ofnew varieties supplied by specialized fannerproducers. While FSEs 
offer a sustainable solution lo the problem of seed supply, the challenge ofimplementing this approach in 
Eastem and Southem Afriea remains formidable. Collaborative linkages need to be fostered between 
furmers, researchers, NGOs, and the formal seed industry. Seed-poliey reforrns need implementing and 
more client-onented research systems must be institutionalized. 
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ProJeet: Arld aud Semi Arld Land (ASAL) Program 
In collaboration with the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI), the Arid and Semi Arid Land 
(ASAL) Program in Laikipia District, Eastem Kenya, supported community-based seed-production 
activities between 1996 and 1999. The crops involved were potaloes, beans, chickpea. trees. and safflower. 
Stringent criteria (e.g., access lo inigation water for off-season production) were Used to select potato-seed 
growers. Training ofproducers covered crop husbandry, group dynamics, leadership. bonkkeeping, and 
marketing. Farmers paid 500!o of cost for potalo seed and fertilizer and the remaining amount after the 
harvest. In 1999 the project was assisting farmers in making direct contact with the national potato research 
institute in order lo secure source seed on a regular basis. The project bought back the initial amount of 
seed given fur sorne crops (beans, safflower). 
Project: Uganda Nationa! Seed Potato Assodatlon 
In 1995, a group of fanners in Kabale and Kisoro Districts, Uganda, formed an association lo produce 
potalo seed commercially afterreceiving training from the National Agricultural Research Organisation 
(NARO) and CIP. The association, Uganda Seed Potato Producers Association (USPPA), is now a 
registered company. Members ofUSPPA purchase seed potatoes from a nea:rby research institute, which 
also provides technical support (training, seed inspection, and economic analysis). In 1999 the association 
consisted of 18 members: 11 men and 7 women. Most producers are aboye average in terms ofresources 
&ince the association requires all members to have an initial capital outlaylo construct a seed-potalo store, 
purcbase pesticide and spray pumps, and have enough land for planned rotations and fallowing. On 
average, production for individual producers is aboye 15 tIha. 
Projed: Rwanda Emergency Agricultura! Project. World Vislon Internatlonal 
The emergency phase ofthe project (1994-95) sougbt lo multiply improved crop varieties and improve their 
supply alter the war. In Gikongoro, Kanazi, and Ruhengeri, the project organized contract fanners to 
multiply beans (bush/climbers) and potaloes. there was an eft'ort to make seed production more sustainable 
and commercially oriented during phase 2 ofthe project (1995-96) by working with fanner associations. 
Work also began in other prefectures during pbase 2. The project ended in January 1999. 
The project assisted fanners in organizing thernselves into associations (made up of various fanner groups) 
and in opening atores to seU inputs. In some arcas, associations already existed, and in others areas, pre-
war associations were reaclivaled. Seed production is done by groups that worlc onder larger associations. 
Where land is scarce (e.g., UmUlara), fanners produce seed individually and pool their harvest. 
The project provided formal training in both seed production and financial and business practices 10 the 
seed committee of each association. It is nol clear whether producer grouPs feCeived any training directly. 
Farmers produced seed ofthe following crops, depending on the prefecture: beans, potatoes, groundnuts, 
soybeans, maize, wheal, sweet potaloes, and cassava. Groups produce a minimum oftwo crops and a 
maximum offour. Source sced was provided by the project; because oftbe collapse ofthe formal seed 
sector, no provision was made lo enable farmers lo aceess source seed on their own. Project statI checked 
seed quality(germination, moisture content) in beans only and'provided packaging material s for beans fur a 
sborttime. 
Project: Seed productlon by women', groups In nortbern TallZllDla 
Since 1999, the Tanzanian National Bean Program has worked with 17 women's groups in the Amsba arca 
to address the seed-supply constraint. The groups are being developed as commercial units to produce 
seed ofmodem bean varieties. The project is attempting to link the groups with slockists 10 address the 
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problem ofmarketing and demand (Contact: Selian Agricultural Rtlsearch Institute, Arusha, Tanzania). 
Project: Improviog seed supply lo beoehmark site~ of tbe Afrlcan Highlands InitlaUve 
Tbe African Highlands Initiative is seeking to address the seOO-delivery bottleneck by supporting efforts to 
establish local seed production units in seven onts benchmark sites in Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Tanzania, 
and Madagascar. Priority crops are identified by farmers and the modalities for seed production are 
formulatOO by various stakeholders, including NGOs, researchers, the formal seOO sector, local 
entrepreneurs, and farmers. 
Activities involve seOO production by farmers (groups and individuals), schools, and church organiutions 
of potatoes, sweet potatoes, beans, rice, wheat, sorghum, forages, indigenous vegetables, which vary by 
site (David, ed. 20(0). 
Project: Kagera Agricultural and Environment Management Project, Tanzanla 
The IFAD-fundOO Kagera Agricultural and Environment ManagementProject supports commercial seed 
production activities fOT the following crops: OPV maize, beans, bananas, cassava, and clonal coffee. The 
project began in 1998 and operates in five distrlcts ofwestern Tanzania. Individual farmers are identifiOO 
(nominatcd at village meetings) and trainOO fortwo days in seed-production methods. Training only covers 
agronomic and post-harvest handling. Participating farmers must be able to devote half a hectare to seed 
production, Farmers are given seed and other inputs as a gran!. Foundation seed is produced by contract 
farmers in each distric!. Seed producers are supervisOO by district seed supervisors trained by TOSCA, the 
national certification authority, and viIJage extension officers, Production is low (250 kg per season for 
beans), The project offers no assistance in marketing. 
The project plans to organize producers into groups to enable them to access credit and lo boost 
production, In 2000, the project worked with more Iban 1000 seed producers, 
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ENDNOTES 
! The case srudy explored fanners' routine crop and seed-procurement strategies to determine how <abnormal' 
the pracrices were (OI were not) during the designated emergency. To-date. seed aid has been given 
without diagnosing what the constraint may be. There has a150 been titde effort to examine the resiliency 
of farme! agricultural or seed systems) or to question whether giving farroees the seed physically 15 the best 
among several potential strategies. 
Specific manuals on seed aid are even more recent and date within the last five yeaes: ODr 1996¡ Oxfam 
1999; Coneem, n.d. 
, Drought should not be equated with a lack of rainfall, per u, but r.ther the degree of r.iofall, whích 
induces a shortage of sorne vital economk good such as a harvesr oc forage. Sandford (1979) explores this 
relative nObon of drollghl in sorne detail. 
.f This issue of food tosts versus seed costs is pursued more fulJy in me complementaty workshop voJume. 
s The Diocese at Embu, recognizing a growing sease oC seed-aid dependency. has proposed "seed-payback 
mech.nísm." (Father ¡ren, Oíocese of Embu, person.1 communic.lion, 1998). 
6 In Machakos, severa} tarmers not only listed emergeacy aid as a rounne source fur maize seed. but food 
stores as wel1. 
1 TIte issue of seed-system diagnosis is !he central theme of the companion volume emerging from the 
workshop on 'Targeted seed aid and seed-system intervenuons: Sttengtheníng smal1-fanner seed systems 
in Ea.t .ad Central Afrie •. " 
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